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Abstract 
The repercussions of September 11, 2011 have been felt worldwide and have 
drastically changed the paradigm in which countries operate today. They have 
justified two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and incursion into sovereign territories in 
pursuit of terrorists and insurgents.  As insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
continued to thrive, Coalition countries have been forced to adjust their approach to 
defeating non-conventional forces that they are largely not trained to fight.  This has 
resulted in tactics that utilize what scholars have called “Smart Power,” a mixture of 
both hard and soft power.  Foreign aid and its distribution in COIN operations has 
sparked a major debate amongst scholars, soldiers and aid industry workers as to who 
should distribute foreign aid and what relationship the military and aid workers 
should have.  I hypothesize that the traditional relationship between aid workers and 
the military in the distribution of foreign aid in COIN operations is inadequate and 
dysfunctional. I will argue that while both parties are important vehicles in the 
distribution of aid, because of the lack of coordination between them, COIN has been 
much less effective.  Therefore, this thesis aims to study the ways in which aid is 
distributed by aid workers and the military, in order to uncover evidence to support 
my thesis and draw conclusions as to what are the best practices in aid distribution, 
when dealing with insurgencies and winning hearts and minds. Traditionally, military 
and aid workers have tried to operate separately from one another, in order to 
maintain impartiality.  However, COIN has called for aid workers to work with troops 
to implement development projects and in some cases troops have been responsible 
themselves for implementing projects.  This has resulted in protests from the 
development community, arguing that soldiers are unqualified to distribute aid and 
separation of the military and aid workers is essential to security.  Using Iraq and 
Afghanistan as case studies, this thesis looks at how foreign aid has been utilized in 
COIN. In the conclusion, based on my research, I make recommendations for ways in 
which countries can improve distribution of foreign aid in the COIN context.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Modern visions of war conjure images of Allied troops landing on the beaches 
of Normandy or fighting in the jungles of Vietnam.  However, just as important in 
winning wars are soft power tactics, in conjunction with hard power, to gain a desired 
outcome. As the West, and in particular the United States, has become dominant in 
conventional warfare, its enemies have been forced to resort to irregular guerilla 
warfare in an attempt to exploit weaknesses in mobility and public support for 
ongoing engagement.  Today in the Afghan and Iraq wars, soft power in the form of 
foreign aid has emerged as a vital component of efforts to defeat insurgents and win 
the hearts and minds of the local population.  
However, arguments rage today over how this power should be wielded in  
Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.  In the “US Government Counterinsurgency 
Guide,” published in 2009 by the Department of State, insurgency is defined as 
“…the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political 
control of a region.”1 As the US has struggled with its efforts to install legitimate 
governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, insurgencies have been one of the biggest 
bottlenecks to security and to the struggle by national and local governments to 
gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the native populations.  One of the principal debates 
that has arisen is over how development aid should be used in COIN efforts and by 
what methods it should be distributed. The United States has spent billions of dollars 
a year in development and aid to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq, in the face of 
insurgents using irregular warfare.  The debate over development aid and COIN has 
become especially pertinent, as the United States is having to make very serious 
budgetary choices as the country deals with a national debt that has grown to an 
                                                 
1
 US State Department, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” US State Department, January 
2009, accessed via www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt. 
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estimated $14 trillion and a global financial crisis with no end in sight.2  This is 
coupled with a global examination of development partner engagement in developing 
countries and the effectiveness of aid dollars.  Because of the massive monetary costs, 
the potential loss of life during COIN campaigns, and the repercussions these actions 
have in an increasingly interconnected and globalized world, the use of development 
aid in COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan deserves more attention.  I hypothesize that the 
traditional relationship between aid workers and the military in the distribution of 
foreign aid in COIN operations is inadequate and dysfunctional. I will argue that 
while both parties are important vehicles in the distribution of aid, because of the lack 
of coordination between them, COIN has been much less effective.  Therefore, this 
thesis aims to study the ways in which aid is distributed by aid workers and the 
military, in order to uncover evidence to support my thesis and draw conclusions as to 
what are the best practices in aid distribution, when dealing with insurgencies and 
winning hearts and minds. 
In what the Bush administration called the “third pillar” of the US national 
Security Strategy and one of the elements of what the Obama administration has 
referred to as “smart power,” aid has become central to US foreign policy in the post 
9/11 world.  In his 2010 National Security Strategy, Obama stated that the United 
States would pursue “…a development budget that more deliberately reflects our 
policies and our strategy, not sector earmarks; and ensure that our policy instruments 
are aligned in support of development objectives.”3 The strategic nature of this 
development assistance is demonstrated in the COIN doctrine and begs the question 
of how aid can best be distributed in order to defeat the insurgencies. In order for the 
                                                 
2
 United States Treasury, http://www.usdebtclock.org/, US Treasury, Accessed April 19, 2011. 
3
 Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy,” The White House, Washington D.C., May 2010, 
accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/homeland-security/, p. 15.  
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distribution of aid to be effective, the mechanisms and policies employed must be 
justified and backed up with results. 
Additionally, aid distribution in Afghanistan and Iraq is important to the 
United States’ support of democracies around the world.  As the Obama 
administration continues to confront insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan it has 
reiterated its commitments.  “… America will persist in promoting peace among 
different peoples and believes that democracy and individual empowerment and need 
not come at the expense of cherished identities.”4  However, some fear the ability of 
the United States to wield smart power as it has in the past is waning.  The continuing 
financial crisis has strained budgets and considering the foreign aid budget is only one 
percent, any budgetary cuts could have major effects.  In a nod to the importance of 
spending every dollar of aid effectively, Chairwoman Kay Granger of the House 
appropriations subcommittee overseeing foreign affairs, argued spending must be 
prioritized to reflect national security interests and furthermore, must stand up to the 
scrutiny of the public.5   
The end of the cold war has changed the dynamics of relations between states 
and given rise to a new group of non-traditional actors that threaten security within 
states and entire regions throughout the world.  The Cold War was led by two distinct 
national powers, the Soviet Union and United States, which created a relatively stable 
bi-polar world. The current insurgents are characterized as more fluid with many 
factions and de-centralized authority, and in the case of Al Qaeda, united by ideology.  
This has made identifying the enemy and negotiating with them more difficult.   
                                                 
4
 Ibid., p. ii. 
5
 Steven Lee Myers, “Foreign Aid Set to Take a Hit in U.S. Budget Crisis,” New York Times, October 
3, 2011, accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/us/politics/foreign-aid-set-to-take-hit-in-
united-states-budget-crisis.html?pagewanted=all.  
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In the particular cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, because the enemy is so 
difficult to identify, the use of foreign aid has become all the more important in 
convincing the populations, among which the insurgents operate, that the 
governments offer a better alternative.  This is done by channeling aid through five 
main categories: bilateral development aid, civilian security aid, military aid, 
humanitarian aid, multilateral development aid and political/strategic aid.6 
Additionally, but perhaps most importantly, the creation of the Iraq and Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Fund has skewed the statistics on foreign aid because of the sheer size 
of the packages each fiscal year.  Of the $104 billion provided since 2002, $57 billion 
has been channeled through the Department of Defense (DoD) budget.7  It is the large 
amount of development aid under the DoD’s control and the infringement upon 
traditional humanitarian space that has sparked debates in the nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO) and aid worker community. 
During the Cold War foreign aid was a tool that the United States used to gain 
influence and stem the spread of Communism.  Aid demonstrated the good will of the 
United States, as well as the prosperity that it enjoyed as a result of its ideology, but it 
also served as an incentive to others to adopt the ideology of the United States.  
However, with the end of the Cold War many donor nations and leaders fell into what 
in retrospect could be seen as a false sense of security.  To some, the fall of 
Communism seemed to highlight the supremacy of liberal democratic societies and 
those that had formed in former republics of the Soviet Union were a testament to the 
peoples’ desire for them.  This resulted in significant cut backs in aid funding in the 
1990s.  Francis Fukuyama went so far as to question whether the end of communism 
signaled “The End of History?” or the triumph of the final form of government to be 
                                                 
6
 Cur Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson. “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of US Programs 
and Policies,” Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2011, pp. 4-7.  
7
 Ibid., p. 10. 
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adopted by man.  Liberal economic policies were seen to be the solution for many of 
the economic and social problems that plagued parts of the globe. 
 While the end of the Cold War brought a wave of nations embracing 
democratic reform, the reality is that liberal democracies were, in fact, not embraced 
by all, and even developing democracies are still mired in extreme poverty.  This calls 
into question whether liberal democracies are even desirable by large segments of the 
global population.  In the Middle East, the Balkans and parts of Asia, autocratic 
regimes still hold power over populations lacking basic freedoms and economic 
opportunities. While the Arab Spring brought about popular uprisings calling for 
democracy and has succeeded in several nations, there is still debate over whether the 
final product of these movements will result in true democracies or more authoritarian 
regimes with religious fundamentalist leanings.   
In the case of Afghanistan, the country has suffered decades of war, been ruled 
by a totalitarian regime and suffered from extreme poverty.  The ruling Taliban was 
notorious for their human rights violations and enforcement of Sharia law and still 
today, as an insurgency, it has been successful in forming a shadow government in 
parts of the country. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World 
Factbook Afghanistan has the world’s second highest infant mortality rate at 151.5 
deaths/1000.  The life expectancy in Afghanistan is 44.65 years, giving the country an 
overall ranking of 221 out of 223 nations. Only 28.5 percent of the population is 
literate, with the average citizen attending school for 8 years.  Additionally, a 2008 
estimate put Afghanistan’s unemployment rate at 35 percent.8  This has caused not 
only the structural decimation of Afghanistan, but also damaged the fabric of Afghan 
culture and civil society, in turn creating a society constantly at war with itself.   
                                                 
8
 CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html 2009 
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The 24-year rule of Saddam Hussein left Iraq with a deeply divided society.  
Stoking ethnic tensions, Saddam put power into the hands of the Sunni minority and 
disenfranchised the Shiites, while massacring Kurd Separatists.  The 1980’s and 90’s 
brought war with Iran and later war with a coalition led by the United States, causing 
damage to the Country’s infrastructure and national defense.  United Nations 
resolution 661 placed stringent economic sanctions on Iraq and in turn pushed the 
country to the verge of bankruptcy and major humanitarian crisis.  While Iraq does 
not suffer from poverty to the same degree as Afghanistan, years of crippling 
economic sanctions, autocratic rule, the US invasion, insurgencies and sectarian 
violence have made for a situation in which the country experiences 15 percent 
unemployment.9  Furthermore, continued violence and insecurity from suicide 
bombings have made recovery and achieving security within the country a slow and 
arduous process.  The invasion of 2003 represented for insurgents and terrorist groups 
an opportunity to challenge the United States.  While officially the duty of 
maintaining security within the country has been handed over to Iraqi security forces, 
the United States until recently maintained a significant military presence within the 
country, creating resentment. 
 The importance of stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be understated.  At 
stake are Iraqi and Afghan lives, stability of the region, American strategic interests 
and American image and prestige around the world.  The perceived failures in 
Afghanistan have caused the American public to question the feasibility of a mission 
that was overwhelmingly supported at its inception. The struggling mission in Iraq 
has also damaged American prestige abroad, as the mission failed to garner support at 
the outset and was not supported by many allies and regional powers.  These factors 
                                                 
9
 Ibid. 
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make studying how aid is distributed of utmost importance.  American power comes 
not only from its military strength, but also from its ability to persuade and 
demonstrate its good will and development aid stands to play a major role in this.  By 
helping to bring security to the region, the United States stands to gain not only allies, 
but also credibility throughout the world.    
The events of 9/11 served as a sobering reminder of the gulf that still exists 
between many members of Muslim nations and the west.  This gulf is not only 
economic, but also in clashing understandings of issues such as rights and governance 
in an increasingly globalized world.  It not only exists in peoples nation of origin, but 
as emigration due to economic circumstances increases, immigrant communities that 
do not integrate often times retain their native understandings of rights and 
governance, causing strains in relations with communities of adopted nations. What is 
not in doubt is that these attacks changed the dynamic of relations between the United 
States, its allies and enemies.   
“The War on Terror,” is a somewhat ambiguous term that has justified action 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other regions throughout the globe.  To resolve 
these new conflicts, it is important not only to use hard power, but also soft power in 
the form of aid.  Using hard power the United States and its allies have had success in 
killing insurgents.  However, in a guerilla war in which insurgents operate amongst 
the communities, civilian casualties and destruction of property is inevitable.  Without 
the use of soft power the United States and its allies will simply be seen as 
destructive.  Although not the entire population will be won over, a majority must 
view the war as bringing about something more than death and destruction.  This 
thesis therefore explores the usefulness of development aid and how it is best 
distributed when in conjunction with a counterinsurgency strategy. It begins with a 
 11
review that will look at the pertinent literature relating to aid effectiveness, COIN and 
smart power.  It will then look at different methods of aid distribution in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, to identify the most effective ways to distribute aid. 
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Chapter 2: Research Design, Analytical Framework 
This thesis hypothesizes that when fighting insurgencies the use of a foreign 
aid strategy that is coordinated by both donors and the military will more likely 
produce results than a strategy of non-coordinated aid.  However, military partners 
and development partners are often at odds.  Therefore, I propose the best way to 
ensure aid effectiveness is to find ways for the military and other development 
partners to coordinate their efforts. 
My hypothesis is based on the following observations. First, insurgencies have 
complex roots.  As opposed to national armies that are under the command of a 
government in power, insurgents grow from the population and communities that do 
not support the government. This can be a result of anywhere from a lack of 
legitimacy, inability to provide services or lack of social justice.10  This makes 
winning the support of the population that the insurgents operate amongst as essential 
to any solution. 
Second, aid serves as one of the many tools that governments use to project 
power and comes in many forms that serve different purposes. Today, development 
aid is key to the counterinsurgency (COIN) mission taking place in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Foreign aid can be divided into five primary types of aid: bilateral 
development aid, economic assistance supporting US political and security goals, 
humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid.11  Analysis of 
budget appropriations over time shows that major events like the Cold War, anti-
narcotics campaigns, and 9/11 have had major effects on the amount of money the 
United States sends abroad.  With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s foreign aid 
                                                 
10
 Ben Connable, “The End of an Insurgency: What President Obama Can Learn From Peru, Angola 
and Colombia,” Foreign Affairs, September 20, 2010, accessed at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66749/ben-connable/the-end-of-an-insurgency 
11
 Curt Tarnoff, Marian Leonardo Lawson, p. 8. 
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declined to an all time low, because much of the aid had been spent on anti-
communist initiatives. This decline in aid reflected a major change in US policy and 
the lack of “big idea” policy objectives after years of predominantly channeling aid 
towards one overall initiative.12  However, since 9/11 aid budgets have increased to 
levels not seen since the Cold War.  Aid allocations in 2010 totaled $39.4 billion 
dollars, the highest levels of foreign aid since 1985.13  Therefore, although aid 
decreased after the Cold War, the post 9/11 environment has made development aid 
all the more important in helping the US to promote democracy, development and 
good governance.  The distribution of aid now aims to achieve five main objectives: 
Peace and Security; Investing in People; Governing Justly and Democratically; 
Economic Growth and Humanitarian Assistance.14  This is relatively clear-cut in non-
conflict situations.  However, in Iraq and Afghanistan, vigorous debates are taking 
place as to how aid should be distributed and what the relationship should be between 
aid organizations, governments and the military. 
Since the attacks of 9/11, bilateral and multilateral development and 
humanitarian assistance have increased significantly and now make up more than 50 
percent of all foreign aid.  Bilateral aid alone accounted for 34 percent of the budget 
and more at certain times in the past decade.  Largely administered by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), it is used to promote 
economic progress and social stability in developing countries, health and education 
initiatives, as well as well-known programs like the Peace Corps and the new 
Millennium Challenge Corporation programs. Aid is also used to provide assistance 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., p. 2. 
13
 Curt Tarnoff, “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy”, Congressional Research 
Service, February 10, 2011, Summary. 
14
 Curt Tarnoff, “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy”, Congressional Research 
Service, February 10, 2009, p. 4. 
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during natural disasters.15  Development assistance allows the United States to 
exercise soft power and create new markets for US goods in the future.  In the case of 
counterinsurgency, this type of aid can win the hearts and minds of the nationals of 
the country, while providing concrete economic and social benefits. 
This increase in development aid is juxtaposed against the decline in the last 
decade of spending on military aid.  Toward the end of the Cold War military 
spending increased 42 percent in 1984, because of the Reagan administrations efforts 
to counter the Soviet threat.16  However, with its conclusion and the rise of new issues 
such as drug trafficking and terrorism, scholars began to study what the root of these 
problems were and many identified poverty and bad governance as the main culprits.  
States in which drug trafficking was rampant and terrorists were found, tended to be 
also wracked by poverty and corrupt governance.17 The events of 9/11 further 
highlighted what many believed to be the correlation between poverty, terrorism, and 
state insecurity.  With this in mind, many policy makers advocated an emphasis on 
the concepts of human security, good governance, and development as key to dealing 
with security issues.18  Consequently, development budgets increased while foreign 
military aid decreased significantly.  In comparison to Cold War budgets, which 
allocated 42 percent towards military aid, the 2011 budget calls for an allocation of 10 
percent.19  To offset the loss of military aid in the annual foreign aid package, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) has increased its share of development spending.  The 
overall increase in the amount of money dedicated to development demonstrates the 
adoption of human security as central in US foreign policy. 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., p. 7. 
16
 Ibid., p.11. 
17
 “The World Development Report 2011: Conflict Security and Development” The World Bank, 2011, 
accessed at http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/ p. 53. 
18
 Curt Tarnoff, Marian Leonardo Lawson, “CRS Report for Congress: Foreign Aid: An Introduction to 
US Programs and Policy”, Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2011 p. 12. 
19
 Ibid., p. 12. 
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It is the role of the DoD in providing aid, that has become a much-debated 
issue.  From fiscal year 1998 to 2005 the DoD’s percentage of Official Development 
Aid (ODA) increased from 3.5 percent to 22 percent, while USAID’s ODA decreased 
from 65 percent to less than 40 Percent.20  These funds are used to pay for 
development projects in support of the governments COIN mission. 
What is at the root of the debate about aid and COIN is how and by whom it is 
distributed, and whether it is effective in achieving its goals of defeating the 
insurgents and winning over the native population.   Therefore in order to support my 
hypothesis, I will proceed as follows: I will examine the COIN operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and compare military aid programs to those by the aid community 
outside of military programs.  The latter will include aid distributed by independent 
NGOs, government programs and multilateral organizations.  Such a comparison will 
allow me to gauge whether COIN initiated development projects or projects 
independent of the COIN mission have been more successful and make a case for my 
suggestions regarding coordination.  I will judge effectiveness by acceptance of 
development of projects by the communities, overall success of projects and the 
prevalence of insurgents in communities targeted by development projects. 
In order to support my hypothesis I will study the distribution of aid by the US 
military in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to judge what are the strengths and 
weaknesses of their practices.  I will juxtapose the militaries practices against those of 
organizations that operate independently of the military.  These will include aid 
distributed by independent NGOs, government programs and multilateral 
organizations.  By gathering data from an array of organizations independent from the 
                                                 
20
 Kaysie Brown and Stewart Patrick, The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the 
DoD’s Expanding Role, Center for Global Development, Working Paper no. 131, November 2007, p. 
4. 
 16
military I will be able to make more informed judgments about organizations that 
operate in different contexts. 
2.1.  
Theoretical Literature on Counterinsurgencies and Development  
Smart Power 
In the study of military tactics the use of “hard power” or force has been 
researched as one of the primary means for winning wars.  With the United States 
engaged in the “War on Terror” and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has, however, 
been a revival of academic research on soft power as well as hard.  
In 2004 Suzanne Nossel authored a piece in Foreign Policy magazine calling 
for what she felt was a need to respond to the growing militarism in American foreign 
policy.  In this article she formulates the concept of a cohesive policy based on the 
exercise of both hard and soft power to more adequately achieve policy objectives.  
This she refers to as “smart power.”21 
Nossel sees smart power as a response to the distinct change in international 
relations. “The unparalleled strength of the United States, the absence of great-power 
conflict, the fears aroused by September 11th, and growing public skepticism of the 
Bush administration's militarism have created a political opening for a cogent, 
visionary alternative to the president's foreign policy.”22  Nossel goes on to argue for 
the adoption of a liberal internationalism that uses an equally weighted combination 
of trade, foreign aid, diplomacy and the spread of American values.23  It is this 
combination of tools that the Obama administration has adopted as part of their COIN 
efforts.   
                                                 
21
 Suzanne Nossel, “Smart Power,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2004), p. 138. 
22
 Ibid., p. 131. 
23
 Ibid., pp.131-132. 
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In large part this is driven by liberal ideals adopted by much of the west.  
These ideals are rooted in what Emanuel Kant called the “Perpetual Peace” and is 
today called the Democratic or Liberal Peace Theory.  This is based on the idea that 
democratic states do not fight each other because of shared rights that include 
freedom from arbitrary authority, referred to as a “negative freedom,” “positive 
freedoms,” which are “those rights necessary to protect and promote the capacity and 
opportunity for freedom” and democratic participation, which guarantees the previous 
rights are not infringed upon.24 After the Cold War ended scholars like Francis 
Fukuyama hypothesized that a wave of liberalism would bring about peace based on 
these shared principles of democratic ideals, individual rights, rule of law and free 
trade.25  This has been challenged in the wake of the struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and scholarly work that argues factors like population, regional affiliations and size of 
economies, play major roles in the likelihood of states going to war.26  The aftermath 
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Arab spring will serve as a further test of 
this theory as more democracies emerge in the Arab region. 
Central to the US and its allies spreading these liberal values will be the use of 
smart power, incorporating development aid and diplomacy as central to official US 
military policy and Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.  Economic aid has even been 
referred to as a “weapons system” by the US military, in a handbook that gives 
soldiers and commanders proper guidelines on how to properly spend money and 
which types of projects.27  Joseph Nye argued that traditionally, the strength of a great 
                                                 
24
 Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 
12, No. 3, (Summer, 1983), pp. 206-207. 
25
 Scott Burchill, et al. Theories of International Relations, 4th ed., Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 
2009, p. 61. 
26
 Htun Ming Kim and David L. Rousseau, “The Classical Liberals Were Half Right (or Half Wrong): 
New Tests of the 'Liberal Peace', 1960-88*,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 5, 2005, p. 540.  
27
 US Army Combined Arms Center, “Handbook 09-27: Commanders’ Guide to Money as a Weapons 
System handbook,” April 2009 accessed via 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_09-27.htm 
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power was made manifest in its ability to wage successful wars.28  This ability was 
attributed to a large power’s control of land, natural resources, military technology 
and human resources, among other things.  This held true for much of history.   
However, many scholars have debated whether interdependence in global 
politics, the world economy, cultures, and societies, have made waging traditional 
wars a more costly and difficult effort than before.  Transnational groups invest large 
amounts of money in countries around the world developing industries, building 
infrastructure, extracting resources, and growing economies.  Because of this 
investment and the impetus on governments to protect them, countries have become 
more interconnected in order to foster these relationships, trade and build economies.  
It is argued that after World War II increased trade between Germany and France 
created an interconnected relationship that fostered peace.  Oneal and Russett argued 
that the increasing economic interdependence “…reinforces structural constraints and 
liberal norms by creating transnational ties that encourage accommodation rather than 
conflict.” 29  Furthermore, “…trade is a mutually beneficial interaction, giving each 
party stake in the economic well-being of the other- and in avoiding militarized 
disputes.”30  For example, while not all democratic and liberal, countries in the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) claim to have more than 
80% of all petroleum reserves, or more than 1 trillion barrels of oil.31  While other 
organizations set these estimates as low as 727 billion barrels, the interdependence of 
the sellers of this oil and the consumers is real.32  Additionally, transnational 
                                                 
28
 Joseph Nye. “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, No. 80, (Autumn 1990), p. 154. 
29
 John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jun., 
1997), p. 269. 
30
 Ibid., p. 270. 
31
 OPEC, “OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2010,” OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 
2010/2011 edition, accessed at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm 
32
 Energy Information Administration, “World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, Mot Recent 
Estimates,” accessed at http://www.eia.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html. 
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companies extract these resources and are dependent on good relations between 
countries in order to turn a profit.  These factors in turn have forced states to utilize 
“soft power” in order to keep good relations, but have not eradicated the option of war 
between states. 
Redefining Security to include Human Security 
The end of the Cold War brought about a shift in relations between states 
throughout the globe, but it also sparked debates as to how development and security 
would be viewed in the future.  During the Cold War the US and its allies had 
programs that were focused on Human Security, seen in initiatives like the Alliance 
for Progress, which called for a “…a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in 
magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people 
for homes, work and land, health and schools.”33  While these types of programs 
highlighted human security, some critics felt there was still too large a focus on the 
territorial security of the states.  Politically speaking, military threats to a nation are 
simple for the average citizen to see as a clear threat to their security.  Richard Ullman 
argued that this way of thinking is misguided because it neglects security threats from 
within a nations border and other non-military threats.34  Many saw the post-Cold 
War as an opportunity to rethink security and development.  
The authors of the 1994 United nations Human Development Report (HDR) 
wished to focus more global attention poverty and accountability by creating a new 
paradigm that shifted focus from state and nuclear security, which had preoccupied 
states during the Cold War, to human security.  Critics felt that the focus on 
sovereignty of states had neglected the security of citizens; especially in developing 
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countries. Instead wealth and advancements had been concentrated in the hands of the 
elite leaving large portions of the population disenfranchised.  Often development aid 
had been misused to enrich leaders.  The United States and the west had continuously 
supported corrupt regimes in the name of stopping the spread of communism, but this 
in turn bred corruption and violence.  In 1993 42 countries were involved in 52 major 
conflicts, while 37 were experiencing political violence.  65 of the 79 countries were 
in the developing world.35  Furthermore, old ethnic tensions, which were largely 
suppressed during the cold war, manifested themselves in the form of civil wars.  
Former dictators fell by the wayside and power struggles ensued.  This highlighted 
the inadequacy of the development agenda.   
The definition of human security is subjective and highlights the complexity 
of the issue.  The new agenda argues that human security has two aspects that can be 
identified, the first being, “…safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and 
repression.”  and second, “…protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the 
patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.”36  Achieving 
human security is largely based around the concept of achieving sustainable and 
people-centered development, as opposed to development strategies that “will 
respond to emergency relief.  Or to fitful policy interventions”37 The overview of the 
Human Development Report states: 
Sustainable human development is development that not only 
generates economic growth but also distributes its benefits equitably; 
that regenerates the environment rather than destroying it; that 
empowers people rather than marginalizing them. It is development 
that gives priority to the poor, enlarging their choices and opportunities 
and providing for their participation in decisions that affect their lives. 
It is development that is pro-people, pro-nature, 
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pro-jobs and pro-women.38 
Defining Human security represents a challenge for scholars and the development 
community.  Some proponents see a vague definition of human security as being 
useful in that it allows for use by a broad array of groups to chip away at the 
traditional security paradigm. 39  They argue that issues like health, environment, 
migration and access to natural resources threaten security and therefore should be 
included because they are as much drivers of insecurity as are military threats.40  
Other Scholars others have argued that too vague a definition risks the term not 
having any meaning at all.  Roland Paris argues that Human Security is like 
“Sustainable Development” in that everyone supports it, but it is very hard to define.41 
This has lead some to attempt to define human security and more importantly find 
ways in which the concept can be incorporated into actual policy. 
In their book The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon, Shannon D. Beebe and 
Mary Kaldor define human security as personal security or security from violence and 
the prevention of violence by mitigating the conditions that lead to violence.42  This 
definition, the authors argue, necessitates coordination in war situations between the 
development community and the military in providing humanitarian space for 
development to take place.   
Beebe and Kaldor are careful to make the distinction between COIN strategy 
and human security.  "Counterinsurgency is not actually human security, however the 
term is defined.  In counterinsurgency, human security, or population security, is a 
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tactic, not a strategy.”43  In contrast, human security seeks to prevent situations from 
escalating into violence.44  It is in the areas that violence is absent development is able 
to take place.  By developing institutions that promote good governance and law and 
order, based on human rights rather than the laws of war, a civil society is able to take 
root.45   
 Beebe and Kaldor argue for the integration of military and civilian personnel 
in achieving development goals.  Traditionally rules of humanitarianism are based on 
the concept of aid workers operating in humanitarian space respected by two sides in 
a conflict.  Today, they argue, these spaces are not as respected and the only places 
that provide security are military bases.  The human security paradigm would create 
spaces that would allow for both security and development to take place.46  This 
concept of integration has sparked an outcry from throughout the development 
community as many have argued the opposite, that aid has been securitized or 
militarized.  In a joint report by more than 20 aid organizations working in 
Afghanistan, they claim that the work of soldiers and civilians and NGOs protected 
by armed guards has compromised the relationship of aid agencies providing 
assistance and development, and the military providing security.47  With or without 
actual coordination between aid organizations and the military, a common 
understanding of roles is necessary to deliver effective aid.  Continued lack of 
agreement creates inefficiencies and can result in a lack of dialogue between parties 
that work in the same space. 
Development Commitments and Aid Effectiveness 
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The end of the Cold War brought new challenges to the international 
community as priorities shifted and new challenges were confronted on multiple 
levels.  The Cold War had provided security in some measure, as nations and their 
leaders were propped up primarily by either the United States or the Soviet Union, 
depending on the political ideology to which a nation subscribed.  With the fall of the 
Soviet Union, many nations were left to fend for themselves and intrastate power 
struggles became more common as decades-old internal problems between religious 
and ethnic groups and challenges to governance came to a head.48  Additionally, the 
distribution of aid saw a significant change, as donors called for a new paradigm of 
engagement in developing countries.  Along with shifting priorities there was a call 
for more effective distribution of development aid, which in turn caused a change in 
the way aid is distributed. 
166 countries and International Organizations adopted the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness, on March 2, 2005, in reaction to a call for countries to change 
the strategies and criteria for aid distribution.  The Millennium Development Goals, 
ten development goals to be achieved by 2015, were a pre-cursor and reaction to the 
grinding poverty that affects a huge portion of the world’s population.  The Paris 
Declaration has since acted as a set of guidelines by which countries have agreed to 
abide, in order to engage in countries most effectively.  “We, Ministers of developed 
and developing countries… resolve to take far reaching and monitorable actions to 
reform the ways we deliver and manage aid as we look ahead to the UN five- year 
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review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) later this year.”49  
Central to the Paris Declaration are five commitments based on past 
experiences and applied in context.  The commitments are to ownership, alignment, 
harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability.50 While the Paris 
Declaration is non-binding, it has put pressure on donors to make aid effective and 
has forced them to allow developing countries to decide how development will 
proceed in their countries.  Commitments to the aid effectiveness paradigm were 
further solidified at the Accra Agenda for Action on September 2-4, 2008 in Accra 
Ghana.  At this meeting, development partners and developing countries reviewed the 
progress made in achieving the goals set in The Paris Declaration and called for 
further country ownership of development, the building of more effective and 
inclusive partnerships and delivering and accounting for development results.51  
The result of adopting these principles has been mixed as some development 
partners have had more success than others in following the commitments.  In 2011, 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) sponsored a 
report that evaluated the success of development partners implementing the Paris 
Declaration from 2005-2010 in 78 countries that received a combined $70 billion and 
results were mixed.  Out of all the 13 targets to be met in 2010, only one, Strengthen 
capacity by co-ordinated support”, was met.52  While significant progress was made 
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in attempting to achieve the others, development partners continue to struggle in 
meeting their commitments.   
The struggle for countries to follow the Paris Declaration commitments is in 
large part owed to the struggles and debates of how to engage in fragile states. The 
2011 World Development Report highlights the fact that 1.5 billion people today live 
in countries that experience chronic violence both political and criminal in nature, 
including violence resulting from organized crime, trafficking and terrorism.53  
Furthermore, the problem of repeated cycles of violence plague the majority of 
conflict affected countries, with 90% having already having experienced a civil war in 
the last 30 years. The mechanisms of the modern international system were based 
largely around fighting national armies.  Much of the violence coming from irregular 
forces is financed through illicit crimes.54   
These statistics do not only have an effect upon the people of these nations, 
but also have major repercussions for nations bordering fragile states and those 
around the world.  The existence of instability and violence because of factors such as 
crime and poor governance in a country results in mass migration internally and 
across borders, sowing chaos in entire regions.  The end of 2009 saw globally a total 
of 42 million people displaced from their homes due to violence.  This included 15 
million people forced to flee across borders and 27 million internally displaced 
people.55  This in turn places stresses on the neighboring countries both politically and 
economically.  Furthermore, illicit crimes to finance operations, increases the drug 
trade around the world, which in turn fuels violence.56  The complexity of engaging in 
fragile states has been recognized; however the major debate that remains is how to 
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engage properly.  These debates inevitably bring up the role of development aid and 
that of the military, and questions of how and who should be implementing aid 
projects. 
In 2007 OECD countries committed to Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, which recognize the need for additional 
guidance when operating in fragile states.  These include: 
1. Take context as the starting point 
2. Do no harm 
3. Focus on state building as the central objective 
4. Prioritize prevention 
5. Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives 
6. Promote non- discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies 
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and different context 
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors 
9. Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance 
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion57 
 
While OECD countries have adopted these rules in principle, implementation of the 
rules has been less than consistent.  Many of the countries that have committed to 
these principles face pressures relating to strategic national interests and security 
objectives that they feel are not adequately addressed. 
 The result of these pressures is seen in the actions of some countries in fragile 
states. These countries argue that violence in communities causes insecurity and 
therefore aid should be targeted differently, specifically, in order to bring security and 
in the case of the COIN mission, to win hearts and minds.  The US military published 
a COIN manual in 2006 that calls for the military to build or assist in the building of 
roads, schools and hospitals, specifically in conflict zones affected by insurgents, in 
order to provide security and secure the hearts and minds of the local populace.58  
Many have seen this as a militarization of aid that focuses on principles other than 
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those agreed upon in 2007 at the OECD conference on Principles for Good 
International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.  They claim that this 
engagement violates commitments like staying engaged and avoiding pockets of 
exclusion.  In contrast, COIN proponents argue that the security situation dictates the 
type of engagement at the time.  “COIN requires Soldiers and Marines to be ready to 
fight and to build- depending on the security situation and a variety of other 
factors.”59  Because of the fluid nature of COIN operations and the focus on winning 
hearts and minds, the ability to follow the prescribed OECD principles is made more 
difficult. 
COIN efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq that have focused on QUICK Impact 
projects in areas that are insecure, while avoiding areas that are more poor, but stable.  
For example, Helmand province receives an estimated $285 per capita.  In contrast, 
the more secure province of Takhar receives $43 per capita.60  A paper sponsored by 
multiple aid organizations, including Oxfam, Afghanaid, Care and Norwegian 
Refugee Council, Ashley Jackson makes the argument that there is too much focus by 
nations on winning hearts and minds as opposed to solving the problems that are at 
the root of poverty and conflict.  “Development projects implemented with military 
money or through military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are 
often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community 
involvement to make them sustainable.”61  However, the military is at odds with this 
viewpoint, as demonstrated with their QUICK Impact projects designed to make 
short-term, quick gains.   
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The embracing of development aid as a carrot for winning hearts and minds 
was furthered with the publishing of the “Commander’s Guide to Money as a 
Weapons System,” making clear the governments’ intentions of using development 
aid to win the war.  “Coalition money is defeating COIN targets without creating 
collateral damage, by motivating antigovernment forces to cease lethal and nonlethal 
operations, by creating and providing jobs along with other forms of financial 
assistance to the indigenous population, and by restoring or creating vital 
infrastructure.”62  This document lays out the different funds available to troops for 
and the necessary protocol for engagement, which focus on loose rules to be followed 
and that are largely under the discretion of commanders.63  Many aid organizations 
argue that as the COIN manual has called for increasing collaboration between the 
military and civilian organizations, this increasing involvement of the military has 
additionally put aid workers at risk.  “The integration of civilian and military efforts is 
crucial to successful COIN operations.”64 “Particularly after security has been 
achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets.  
This is a time when “money is ammunition.””65  This has brought with it worries of 
the safety of aid workers, as in some cases, aid workers associated with coalition 
forces have become the targets of insurgent attacks.66  These examples expose the rift 
between the development community and government’s commitment to aid 
effectiveness.  This debate is made more complex as the military has become more 
involved in the distribution of aid and has its own COIN objectives to meet.   
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 COIN  
COIN strategy as reflected in the US army manual of 2006 as well as a US 
government guide of 2009, developed in response to irregular warfare in Iraq and 
Afghan wars, calls for a coordinated relationship between political, economic, 
information and security functions.67 At the center of this rethinking is the idea that 
soft power and foreign aid will win the battle for hearts and minds and turn the tide of 
the war in the United States’ favor.  Soft power tactics include diplomacy, 
propaganda, and foreign aid to demonstrate social and political values, in order to 
persuade indigenous populations to accept the legitimacy of the national government.  
David Kilcullen, a former Australian soldier was picked by General David 
Petraeus to help author the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide.  In his book, 
Killcullen argued that there should not be a separation of the military and 
development community in COIN because of the fact that development during COIN 
is not a typical war.  Rather, the aid community is a key player in gaining the trust and 
support of the local population.68  Furthermore he argues that aid is the key to 
successful COIN because in the end the people are choosing between the government 
and or the insurgents and seeking “survival by certainty.”69  In the end, it is human 
security that is at the root of what most people strive for in their daily lives.   
The history of development aid is one checkered with failures and successes 
that have spurred the international community to evaluate best practices in order to 
deliver aid in the most effective manner.  The COIN missions undertaken in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the recent financial crisis add another dimension to this 
debate and warrant further analysis.  By taking into account the human security 
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paradigm, COIN policies and how aid is distributed, I will be better able to 
understand whether coordinated aid distributed at the behest of the military in Iraq 
and Afghanistan is more effective than traditional aid distribution. 
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Chapter 3 Pros and Cons of Some Coordinated Aid Projects 
 The use of foreign aid as a tool was seen in the unsuccessful efforts by 
the US in the Vietnam War to win over the Vietnamese population.  From 1961 to 
1968 the United States invested $2.9 billion dollars in foreign aid in South Vietnam, 
in attempts to win over the indigenous population.70 In 1967 the US AID budget for 
Vietnam totaled more than $550 million. Taken from its total budget that was more 
than $2 Billion, this represented a concerted effort by the US Government to garner 
indigenous support within Vietnam.  The projects spearheaded by the US during this 
time were similar in nature to those being implemented in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
including schools, hospitals and highways.71 However, because of the failure of the 
United States in Vietnam, development aid used for winning hearts and minds in war 
should be wielded with caution. 
In 2006, the US Army released, for the first time in 20 years, a completely 
revised counterinsurgency manual that called for an expanded role in efforts to win 
over civilian populations affected by insurgents.  General David Petraeus spearheaded 
this in reaction to the US Army’s experiences in the Iraq War.  What is most 
important to take note of in the new COIN manual is that the military has been called 
on to take on a non-traditional role that will require adaptation on a level that is 
radically different from the conventional training given to soldiers.  The foreword to 
the manual is the first piece of evidence of the changing role of soldiers.  “They must 
be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in 
rebuilding infrastructure and basic services.”72 Traditionally, soldiers have been 
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deployed in battlefields to fight an enemy.  In the introduction to the manual it is 
explicitly stated that the objective is “…to secure the safety and support of the local 
populace…” as necessary to success.73 The manual goes on to repeatedly emphasize 
the role of the soldier in nation building. These objectives are important in that they 
allow the US to seem less like an occupying force, and more as a provider of security.  
An interagency counterinsurgency guide, similar to that of the US Army’s, 
was released by the US government, in concert with several government agencies in 
2009.  It calls for a more multifaceted operation that utilizes soft power noting, “A 
successful COIN operation meets the contested population’s needs to the extent 
needed to win popular support, while protecting the population from the insurgents.”74 
This represents not only a new strategy in COIN, but also redefines traditional 
humanitarian and development aid as a more explicit tool of the US military.  With 
government agencies including the military becoming involved in administering 
foreign aid, traditional agencies, like USAID and NGOs also stand to lose access to 
the limited foreign aid that is available.  Additionally, traditional standards for how 
foreign aid is distributed have changed and have sparked debate within the 
development community as to what are best practices. 
For the Afghanistan and Iraq War, the U.S has implemented a plan that 
utilizes soft power within a COIN strategy as a tactic to defeat insurgencies.  In a 
speech to NATO forces before he was fired, General Stanley McChrystal, reiterated 
the importance of soft power to a successful COIN strategy.  “It’s not the number of 
people you kill, it’s the number of people you convince.  It’s the number of people 
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that don’t get killed. It’s the number of houses (that) are not destroyed.”75  The 
adoption of soft power by the military presents major challenges to the capabilities of 
an institution that trains and deploys soldiers to engage enemies in combat.  It begs 
the question of whether soldiers are qualified and have the skills to properly carry out 
such a mission.   In turn, questions about the role of the military and whether they 
should be engaged in implementing soft power policies, such as foreign aid, are called 
into question.  
PRTs 
The continuing resilience of and violence perpetuated by insurgencies in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq have forced the US government and military to make drastic 
changes not only in their military strategy, but also in their relationship with the aid 
community.  Traditional relationships have been questioned and governments are 
struggling to effectively utilize and implement what amounts to billions of dollars 
worth of foreign aid through new and untested strategies and programs.  This is in the 
hopes of building political legitimacy, gaining security and winning the hearts and 
minds of the population. These changes have sparked debates as to not only what best 
practices are, but also how distribution methods affect the perceptions of donors by 
populations living in the conflict zone. 
 Effectively getting civilians and military units to work together in post conflict 
zones has always been one of the main challenges because of the need to adhere to 
humanitarian principles.  The presence of the insurgencies has magnified this problem 
as aid workers have struggled to provide humanitarian and development aid in 
conflict zones, while trying not to appear biased towards coalition forces, which 
threatens the security of civilians.  
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 Driving much of the debate about the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has 
been the attempts by the US military to provide aid in insecure areas.  While in certain 
areas the military may be the only party able to implement aid programs, the general 
feeling among aid workers and many government officials is that professionals with 
expertise are the preferred party to implement projects.  In many zones in which the 
military has been working there has been vocal criticism of what is perceived as the 
use of aid as a political tool for winning hearts and minds, and a lack of 
communication with communities.   
The increase in the Department of Defenses’ (DoD) involvement in the Iraqi 
and Afghan humanitarian and development missions is evident in the creation of 
several programs that have combined military and civilian capabilities. A prime 
example of this has been the formation of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRT), which combines “…civilian and military personnel in order to meet stability 
objectives in a defined region.”76  The PRTs were a reaction to increasing violence in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the inability to provide humanitarian and development aid 
to civilians living in insecure areas.  Most NGOs were not able to operate outside of 
safe zones protected by coalition forces and the US government recognized the need 
to address the lack of aid distribution.  The provision of aid also falls in line with the 
military’s COIN goal of winning the hearts and minds of civilians.77  In a news 
conference, former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice described the role of the PRT 
as crucial to what is known as the “clear, hold and build” strategy. "Our military 
operations must be fully supported and integrated with our civilian and diplomatic 
efforts across the entire US government to help Iraqis clear, hold and build throughout 
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all of Iraq.”78  To many aid workers and policy makers this represented a dangerous 
encroachment on humanitarian space and the traditional separation from the military. 
Initially formed in Afghanistan in 2004 and later adopted in Iraq, PRTs were 
created with the intention of extending the influence of the national governments, and 
to encourage NGOs and international actors to focus on development and 
reconstruction in rural areas.  Their goals included contributing to the reconstruction 
process and coordinating with the UN Missions, NGOs and international 
organizations.79  In order to undertake the PRT’s mission, the US government had the 
massive task of creating a system that recruited qualified civilians to operate in 
conflict zones alongside soldiers under extreme conditions.  While soldiers are trained 
for fighting, their skill sets are not specific to providing humanitarian aid or 
implementing long-term development projects.  In turn, an aid worker does not have 
the same skills as soldiers.  The PRT model calls for both parties to carry out tasks 
that have historically been exclusive from one another.   This gives an idea of the 
daunting task that lay before the government. 
The actual structure of the PRT, while differing in some respects, follows a 
general pattern in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  The departments of the government 
with representation in the PRTs are the Department of State (DOS), USAID, the DOD 
and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  The military objective is 
to provide security for the entire PRT in regions that have been identified by the 
government as key to stabilization.  Meanwhile, the role of civilian aid workers from 
USAID is to carry out reconstruction projects, while the DOS oversees the political 
and reporting aspects of the projects.  What is especially unique is that all parties 
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involved, civilian and military, are required to give their approval in order for projects 
to move forward.80  This structure demonstrates how interconnected the actors within 
the PRTs are and how it has changed the relationship between civilians and soldiers.  
Furthermore, their actions are explicitly political in their efforts to defeat 
insurgencies.  While the PRT Playbook claims that the PRT is not a development 
agency, one could claim that is merely semantics.   “A PRT stabilizes an area through 
its integrated civilian-military focus. It combines the diplomatic, military, and 
developmental components of the various agencies involved in the stabilization and 
reconstruction effort.”81 Among other things, the goal of the PRT is clearly to provide 
development after hostilities. 
Central to the success of the PRT mission has been its funding and the ability 
to distribute resources in a timely fashion.  What has become one of the most useful 
sources for funding is the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP).  
CERP was created in 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, in order to 
create stability in the field in a timely fashion.  According to Mark Martins, “This 
Program will enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out 
programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction 
of Iraq.”82  While originally funded by the Iraqi government with seized funds from 
the Ba’athist party, the fund was soon emptied after the war because of the poor Iraqi 
oil infrastructure and inability to generate income.  This resulted in the US 
government supplementing the fund.83  The CERP, which has become one of the 
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major resources for the PRTs to fund infrastructure projects, is administered by the 
DOD and has played a major role in funding reconstruction in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  
While indispensable in helping provide funds for the PRTs in a timely fashion, 
it has at the same time given the military broad powers in making crucial decisions 
with little oversight.  In the “Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System,” 
commanders are encouraged to, “As much as possible, use the existing processes at 
the province level (for example, provincial reconstruction development committee 
reviews) to obtain local provincial government participation in planning...”84 This has 
allowed for the participation of the Iraqi and Afghan government, but at the same time 
leaves it in the hands of the commanders to decide when it is “possible” to utilize 
government institutions.  In a report by the US Government Accountability Office on 
Iraq PRTs, members reported that the correct government officials were interviewed 
before beginning projects.85 However, reviews of projects found projects that were 
unfinished or had not been maintained after the PRT left.86  This highlights the 
dangers in projects that are implemented too quickly, and do not have the proper 
institutions to support them after the PRT has left.  That has resulted in questions of 
effectiveness and accountability with respect to projects implemented under the 
program. 
Iraq PRTs 
The insurgency in Iraq arises largely from ethnic tensions, with Sunni 
insurgents fearful of a Shi’ite and Kurd government seeking revenge for years of 
oppression under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist party.  While security has largely 
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improved in Iraq in 2011, the insurgency is still operating and is being countered on 
all fronts.  With violence spiraling out of control in 2004 and 2005, the United States 
formed PRTs in Iraq based on those being used in Afghanistan.  At this point in time 
there was legitimate fear of a civil war breaking out.  Furthermore, the killing of aid 
workers in Iraq (including the director of CARE’s Iraq office) and Afghanistan had 
made working in the countries too unsafe for many NGOs.87  It was the formation of 
PRTs that aimed to fill this role of providing much needed aid for civilians living in 
areas affected by insurgents.  The reaction to PRTs in Iraq has been mixed, with some 
groups trumpeting their success and others highly critical.   
As of 2010, $154.12 billion had been spent for relief and reconstruction efforts 
in Iraq.  Of this amount, $56.81 billion had been donated by the United States alone.  
In 2004 alone, the US spent almost $20 billion in an effort that was significantly 
larger than the similar efforts in Afghanistan.88  As security has improved, the Iraqi 
government has begun to take more responsibility for funding their reconstruction 
with money from oil revenues and the US donations have decreased significantly.   
Table 3.1: US and Iraqi Support for Reconstruction, 2003-2010 $ Billions (% 
of combined annual funding) 
 
Source: “Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” Quarterly Report to the US Congress, October 30, 2010, p. 24 
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However, the sheer amount of money spent in that short period of time justifies a 
closer look at the effectiveness of aid distributed during that time period.  
Originally civilians from the DOS and USAID ran the PRTs in Iraq and 
operated at the provincial level.  However, with the “New Way Forward” introduced 
by the Bush administration in 2007, utilizing a strategy of 5 core principles to create 
stability and self reliance and the troop surge in 2007, there was the creation of what 
was known as the embedded PRTs (ePRT), which embedded with Brigade Combat 
Teams (BCT) to go into the neighborhoods at the local level in order to provide aid.89  
The embedding of the PRTs with the military created a new structure that was largely 
ad hoc because of time constraints and the continued insecurity on the ground. 
Dealing with soldiers and civilians working closely together on a mission with 
differing objectives, many teams were forced to confront issues ranging from 
personalities to priorities, which in some cases created tensions and certain levels of 
inefficiency.  Moreover, at times, because of a lack of training, many of the ePRTs 
were not able to hire adequately qualified civilian staff.  This resulted in the position 
of aid workers being filled by military personnel with little experience.90  As the US 
continues their efforts to integrate civilian and military capabilities, the fact that the 
PRTs are untested beforehand presents the question of whether they are able to use 
aid money in an efficient way.  While it is likely that this capacity will improve 
overtime, in the meantime filling skilled positions with unqualified military personnel 
is bound to result in wasted money, poor delivery of aid and an inability to meet 
mission objectives. 
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Because of an improving security situation in 2008, PRTs had a stronger 
civilian presence than in the past but still struggled in areas of relative insecurity.  
Operating in specific areas where the insurgency was the most powerful, the PRTs did 
not have as much flexibility to implement projects and instead served more as 
advisers to the military.  This involved them recommending ways in which projects 
could be quickly implemented to win hearts and minds and gain an advantage.  
However, these recommendations were beholden to whether commanders felt the 
region was secure enough to carry out projects in the manner in which advisors 
recommended and could be ignored at anytime.91  This highlights the short-term as 
opposed to long-term gains that are at the core of COIN and more importantly the 
subordinate relationship the civilian aid PRT members have vis-à-vis the military.  
Because the military has so much influence in a PRT, if there is not a good 
relationship between the civilian and military branch, the military has the ability to 
disregard advice.  
The relationship between the actors in PRTs is of utmost importance because 
much of the funding culled from the CERP and the aid workers security is dependent 
on the cooperation of the military team.  The CERP fund has allowed commanders to 
have access to grants of up to $500,000 without having to go through the usual 
bureaucratic steps. 92 The point of the fund has been to give commanders the ability to 
act on projects that require immediate funds.  This is a very valuable program, but at 
the same time it has created problems within the PRT because commanders, who are 
not experts in development, can decide which projects they deem necessary.  While 
security is of the utmost importance, the ability of aid to be effective is largely 
dependent on identifying the needs of the population.  If the right projects are not put 
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into place the potential for waste increases.  Additionally, because the security of the 
civilian team is the responsibility of the military, they dictate much of the civilian 
team’s movement.  A study by the House Armed Services committee found that PRT 
members surveyed felt they lacked adequate security some or all of the time they 
were deployed.  Furthermore, without a military escort they are not able to meet with 
people in the communities in which they work. One PRT civilian member described 
the importance of being on good terms with the military stating, “If Brigade did not 
like you it would have been difficult.”93  This highlights what aid workers sacrifice 
when they are embedded with the military.  When working independently, their safety 
to a large extent, is of their own concern.  By embedding with troops in highly 
insecure areas, their safety becomes the responsibility of the military and 
consequently limits their ability to move freely. 
The funding of the PRTs in Iraq also has had a major effect on the US foreign 
aid budget and has caused a major shift in funds distributed by the government.  
Funding for PRTs is made available through programs like the Quick Response Fund 
(QRF) and the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council fund.  The QRF was 
created in Iraq in 2007 by the DOS in response to the DODs creation of the CERP.  
The program allows for the distribution of grants from $25,000 to $500,000 through a 
streamlined process for obtaining funds.  PRT leaders approve purchases of under 
$25,000, resulting in faster approvals of large amounts of money for COIN 
objectives.94  While this allowed for more flexibility, it also resulted in cases of fraud 
and less of a chance for a bidding process that was most beneficial to the government.  
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Part of this is a result of the fact that independent contractors have been hired by the 
PRTs because of the lack of security.  
Civilian PRTs travel with armed security contingents, which in turn attracts a 
great deal of attention.  Consequently, often-times unqualified proxies were hired to 
do the work of PRT members.95  This is an example of the problems that occur 
because of the relationship between the civilian and military arm of the PRT.  By 
being seen as complying with the military or a political agenda, the civilian actors 
become targets themselves.  “We can distinguish who is NGO and who is PRT and 
we also know that there are civilians in the PRT.  They seem to be dangerous and 
have hidden agendas.  They make us suspicious.”96  The suspicion by the general 
population is evidence that the hearts and minds campaign may need to make major 
adjustments in order to achieve its goals.   
 As opposed to NGOs that work as professionals in development and tend to 
work in communities for long periods of time and develop close relationships, 
contracting firms are present for only as long as the contract and then tend to leave. 
This in turn has led to some contractors producing shoddy work and cases of 
corruption that leave the community feeling taken advantage of or distrustful of the 
government and coalition forces.  In one example, the PRTs hired the contracting firm 
Development Alternative Inc. (DAI) to disburse grants and purchases.  According to a 
report, DAI’s charges to USAID appeared to be relatively high, with charges of $.45 
of every $1 going to the company.  Additionally, the subcontractor was awarded on 
average an 8 percent of grant totals for distributing funds.  In the end this resulted in 
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an average cost of $.61 per $1 of grant money distributed.97  The high cost of 
contractors can partly be attributed to the insecure nature of working in conflict zones. 
While costs are high, at times, the PRTs are faced with few options of contractors 
qualified to implement projects.  Testifying in Congress, the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction acknowledged the problem when asked whether 
fraud and waste were present in reconstruction in Iraq: 
Regarding waste, yes; regarding fraud, no. The overuse of cost-plus 
contracts, high contractor overhead expenses, excessive contractor 
award fees, and unacceptable program and project delays all 
contributed to a significant waste of taxpayer dollars.98 
 
The hope is that if the US government’s attempt to build the capacity of their 
coordinated civilian and military capabilities is successful, this will become less of an 
issue in the future. 
In 2009, Iraq PRTs submitted reports measuring progress in five different 
categories; Governance, Political Development, Economic Development, Rule of Law 
and Reconciliation.  Looking at the time period from late 2007 to August 2008, the 
PRTs reported a significant positive change in all categories.99  In large part, this has 
been attributed to the troop surge of late 2007 and puts the PRTs in a positive light.  
However, the fact that the analysis was carried out by the PRTs themselves suggests a 
conflict of interest. For a more objective analysis, the PRTs need to have outside 
firms conducting evaluations to gauge the effectiveness of projects. 
While the Iraq PRTs have encountered many challenges in their fight to 
provide security against insurgents, they have also had successes in COIN.  The 
Community Stabilization Program (CSP) was initiated to help Iraqi leaders bring 
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stability to communities throughout the country.  One of the major problems 
contributing to the problem of the insurgency was that of unemployment among 
males.  Because of the lack of jobs, the insurgency was able to attract Iraqi males to 
their cause with promises of wages.  Working through the PRTs the CSP helped to 
sponsor programs to provide job skills and employment opportunities in insecure 
areas.  This included more than 54,000 jobs for formerly unemployed Iraqis.100  
Furthermore, funds provided by the CSP were used to help complete infrastructure 
projects and provide grants for small businesses.101  In this case, the PRT was able to 
successfully facilitate the implementation of programs that brought stability to 
insecure regions.  But more importantly, the work of the PRT helped in achieving the 
COIN goals of gaining legitimacy for the Iraqi government. 
The PRT’s work with provincial governments helping them create effective 
budgets has been especially successful.  In helping the government to provide 
services, they are achieving the essential COIN goal of the government,  
strengthening capacity, and gaining legitimacy.  The role of the PRT is to provide 
training in the skills that many Iraqi officials lack, such as budgeting and project 
management.102  By providing workshops and facilitating meetings, the PRT is able to 
interact with the populace and encourage community development of governance and 
ownership of projects. Success stories like these clearly demonstrate their ability to 
create programs that are successful; however a lack of independent analysis of their 
work has limited our understanding of how successful they actually are in 
implementing cost effective programs. 
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Today in Iraq, the US military has taken a largely behind the scenes 
supportive role to the Iraqi security forces as security has slowly improved.  As the 
US continues to withdraw troops from the country, there has been a movement away 
from COIN and more into stabilization efforts.  Consequently, the ePRTs are being 
phased out and civilians are once again working as advisers within the government. 
As the US continues to spend large amounts of aid money in the country to defeat 
insurgents, while the deficit increases at home, the evaluation of aid effectiveness has 
become all the more crucial. In light of the evidence, it is clear that there are serious 
questions as to whether PRTs are as effective as people had hoped and at the least, 
suggests that there needs to be changes in the way they are run and the zones of 
operation. 
Afghanistan PRTs 
While the invasion of Afghanistan in 2003 brought the full brunt of the US 
military on the country, planning by the US government failed to take into account the 
resilience of the Taliban insurgency.  Problems were further compounded with the 
invasion of Iraq and the subsequent diversion of resources away from Afghanistan.  
Today, the US military and coalition forces are approaching the ten year anniversary 
since the invasion of Afghanistan and the Taliban still is considered a serious threat to 
the security of the country.  Operating in Afghanistan and in the autonomous tribal 
region of Pakistan, the Taliban has employed guerilla style tactics to destabilize 
regions of the country.  Meanwhile, there is evidence that they simultaneously operate 
a shadow government that collects taxes, appoints officials, operates courts and 
threatens to gain the support of people who favor the rough justice of the Taliban, as 
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opposed to the corruption of the Hamid Karzai government.103  The inability of the 
GoIRA to provide security and good governance, has only further served to embolden 
the Taliban and discredit a seemingly inept government. 
As the war has dragged on there has been a concerted effort by donors and 
recipients to distribute aid in the most effective manner possible.  The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is especially relevant in that it calls for coordination 
between donors and recipients that in some cases has proven  elusive in the war in 
Afghanistan.  Drafted in 2005, the declaration laid out partnership commitments that 
included ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual 
accountability.104  While donors have attempted to follow these guidelines, the ability 
to adhere, has in large part, been dictated by the security situation in the provinces or 
the goals of donor nations.  In the case of the Afghan PRTs, they have taken on a 
bigger mission that not only aligns civil society, but also gives the military an 
expanding role in development initiatives designed to win hearts and minds.  As was 
the case in Iraq, critics argue that PRTs use of aid to achieve security objectives 
violates core humanitarian principles, resulting in failed development projects. 
PRTs were originally formed in Afghanistan in response to the continuing 
security issues facing the NATO- led International Security Assistance Force.  The 
original idea of the PRTs, formulated in 2002, was to provide a civil-military force 
that combined military, diplomatic and economic functions in order to bring security 
and stability to unstable regions.105  Today, the composition of the PRTs is largely 
dictated by the security situation in the region in which they are operating.  
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Depending on the situation and the country running the PRT, some have more 
integrated civilian-military functions, while others are careful to have limited 
coordination.   
American PRTs work largely independently from other countries along the 
insecure Pakistan border.  Relatively speaking, they are small with a predominantly 
military presence and three or four civilian advisors from the Department of State and 
USAID.  In 2009, PRTs in Afghanistan had 1021 military staff and 35 civilian staff in 
the entire country.106 Similar to PRTs in Iraq, Afghan PRTs have military 
commanders that retain final authority, while PRT Civil Command group acts as 
advisors.107  
The funding of Afghan PRTs is also very similar to that of the Iraq PRTs; 
however the amount of money dedicated to Afghanistan is vastly different.  With the 
invasion of Iraq, much of the US foreign aid budget was diverted away from 
Afghanistan.  Even with the invasion in 2001, Afghanistan continued to receive less 
foreign aid than Palestine, India and China in 2002, and less aid than Iraq, Vietnam 
and Tanzania in 2003.  However, this changed in 2008 when Afghanistan became the 
largest recipient of aid in the entire US budget.108  Of the foreign aid budget for 
Afghanistan, GIRoA estimates that $2 billion was used by Afghan PRTs to support 
reconstruction, security sector reform and better governance.  The GIRoa 
Development Assistance Database has tracked $939.2 million in foreign aid that has 
been channeled through foreign militaries.  However, the Afghan Ministry of Finance 
estimates that an estimated $14.9 billion in untracked foreign aid was channeled 
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through foreign militaries between 2002 and 2009.109  This is another example of the 
significant amount of power that the military has in dictating the foreign aid agenda 
and the types of development projects that are pursued.   
Clearly, there is an integration between the military and civilian functions, but 
the more important question is how effective are they.  While each country has 
created its own PRT models, adopting the best practices of each has been difficult 
because of the restrictions that national politics place on what they are able to do.  The 
American PRT is focused on Quick Impact Projects in very insecure regions, while 
other countries’ PRTs are more focused on long term development projects.  In some 
PRTs there has been a strong military presence, while in others, their ability to work 
with the military is limited.  Much of this is related to the security situation in the 
places where they are located, but the influence of home country politics is prevalent 
as well and influences their ability to function.110  While the PRTs are attempting to 
coordinate their civil-military capacity to distribute foreign aid, they are lacking in 
their ability to coordinate between PRTs of different countries.  This in turn has 
created inconsistencies in their success rate. 
The actual work that the PRTs have carried out has been widely criticized by 
the NGO community.  NGOs have been adamant from the beginning in their 
opposition to the coordination of civil and military distribution of aid and much of the 
work of the PRTs seemed to support their fears.  Prior to 2005, the PRTs lacked the 
expertise of qualified USAID representatives and consequently their projects were 
poorly planned and at times overlapped with the work of NGOs operating in the 
region.  Often times, in the hopes of winning hearts and minds, they would build 
schools in regions with no trained teachers or build hospitals where there were no 
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doctors.111  This in turn created resentment from Afghans and aid workers who felt 
that in the governments push to win hearts and minds by distributing aid, they were 
sabotaging quality work done by NGOs. 
The public’s perception of the PRTs plays a major role in gauging their 
effectiveness overall.  Central to COIN is the mission to inject large amounts of aid in 
order to win the hearts and minds of the population. However, the way that PRTs 
have utilized aid to accomplish this has been called into question.  To the detriment of 
some of the PRTs and to many civilians, they are seen as secretive and lacking the 
transparency that is present in the work of independent NGOs or those associated with 
GoIRA programs.  This has created suspicion and a negative perception of the PRTs.  
Additionally, because of the overall focus on creating security and meeting political 
goals, the PRTs, as opposed to NGOs, are seen as not listening to the needs and 
concerns of the population.112   
In areas like the Balkh province in the north of Afghanistan, PRTs were seen 
as having some success in bringing security, but residents were skeptical as to the 
ability of development aid to bring about long-term change.  Instead, residents argued 
that the real drivers of insecurity were governance, ethnicity and ideology, which 
could not be addressed with development projects.113  This suggests that there needs 
to be a re-evaluation of where funds are used and more robust oversight into the 
effectiveness of these project in achieving COIN objectives.  The US has invested 
large amounts of development money in the hopes that development will bring 
security, when evidence suggests that there may not actually be a strong enough 
correlation to warrant this level of investment. 
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Regional disparities in funding have also been a major driving force in creating 
resentment within Afghanistan.  Because of the focus on security and development, 
large amounts of aid have been channeled through PRTs in the southern provinces.  
(See Map 3.2) On average, Uruzgan and Kandahar received PRT funding of an 
average of $150 per person, while Helmand, Paktika and Zabul received an average of 
$75 per person.  This is in contrast with central and northern provincesthat have been 
relatively more secure, like Faryub, Daikundi, and Takhar, which received on average 
of less than $30 per person.114 To many Afghans, the concentration of aid in the 
violent southern regions seems to reward insecure provinces, while punishing 
peaceful provinces in what is referred to as the “peace penalty.”  This was summed up 
by a group of elders:   
We see the situation in Khost, where there is 
lots of aid, and wonder if we should try to attract 
that with tak o took [a bit of noise]. No attention 
is being paid to the peaceful places. Sholgara was 
the first place to quit opium cultivation, but we 
haven’t received anything. We asked for a tractor 
from the Agriculture Department, but we didn’t 
get anything.115 
 
Map 3.2 Afghanistan Provinces 
 
Source: Afghan Provinces Map, accessed April 19, 2011 at http://mapprojectionpic.co.cc/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/wpid- 
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This highlights the ill effects that aid based on military and political objectives can 
have on the efforts made by the government to gain legitimacy. The attempts to bring 
security to insecure regions through short-term development seem to have the effect 
of actually fueling resentment.  Furthermore, disproportionate amounts of aid 
funneled to insecure provinces creates the bigger problem of the possibility of 
persistent poverty in those provinces that are secure, creating opportunities for 
insurgents to take advantage of disenfranchised citizens.116  The frustration of the 
Afghans with the PRTs concentration of aid in the south points to the complicated 
nature of distributing aid in coordination with the military. (Table 3.3) As aid is 
channeled to specific regions of the country to achieve 
Table 3.3: Completed, Ongoing, Planned, and Funded PRT Spending Per 
Capita, Per Province 
 
Source: Matt Waldman. “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” ACBAR Advocacy Series, March 2008, p. 
12. 
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military and political goals, the campaign to achieve hearts and minds has been 
undermined.  The PRTs face a difficult task in walking the fine line between 
achieving military and political goals, while meeting the needs of the entire Afghan 
population. 
Major impediments to the success of the PRTs have also been observed in the 
way in which the PRTs are run, resulting in insufficient and poor quality projects. The 
short-term deployment of many PRT aid workers has resulted in problems in 
implementing successful projects.  The length of deployment for PRT aid workers 
tends to be one-year contracts, after which they are replaced by new workers.  This is 
in comparison with NGO employees, who tend to have either been present in 
provinces prior to the war or are devoted to longer-term projects.  The short length of 
PRT worker’s deployment results in a lack of workers with a broad knowledge of the 
dynamics of the region in which they are working and forces lessons to be re-learned.  
Therefore, there has been a focus on small as opposed to large-scale and long-term 
projects, which require more knowledge and organization.117  This means that many 
of the major underlying reasons for persistent poverty and insecurity cannot be 
properly addressed.  Furthermore, the military is faced with the reality that, at times, 
their goals do not align with those of the GoIRA or the aid community, forcing them 
to make choices that are contrary to the principles laid out in the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness.118  This has caused tension between the aid community, Afghan 
Civilians, GoIRA, and the military. 
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Chapter 4 Pros and Cons of Some Independent (Uncoordinated) Aid Projects in 
Afghanistan and Iraq 
 In both post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a recognizable need for 
both continuing efforts to ensure military security and for reconstruction. In both 
countries, massive amounts of aid are being distributed in order to win the hearts and 
minds of the population and gain stability, and legitimacy for the central government. 
A small percentage of aid can be classified as “uncoordinated” aid, distributed 
through three channels: bilateral aid from governments, aid distributed through 
multilateral organizations and aid distributed through private NGOs. 
 Table 4.1: Top 5 recipients of ODA From Donors Reporting to the OECD 
DAC, 2001-2009, Constant 2008 Prices, US$ Billion 
Source: Lydia Poole. “Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002-2010,” Development Initiatives, January 2011, 
accessed March 24, 2011 at http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/afghanistan-tracking-major-resource-flows-
2002-2010, p. 6. 
Today in Afghanistan, foreign aid has become a major component of the 
stabilization efforts.  According to a recent report by Development Initiatives, from 
2002-2009, a total of $26.7 billion dollars was spent on aid initiatives in Afghanistan, 
making it one of the top recipients of foreign aid in the world.  In 2000, Afghanistan 
was ranked 69th in terms of the amount of Official Development Aid (ODA) it 
received in comparison with other countries.  By 2008, seven years after the invasion, 
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Afghanistan was the largest recipient of ODA in the world (Table 3.1).119  While this 
is a significant increase in aid, it is significantly less than the actual amount pledged, 
amounting to a total of $62 billion by donor nations.  This means that donors have 
actually only met 43.1 percent of their overall pledges.120  What is more telling is the 
amount of aid that is outside of the control of the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan (GoIRA).  It is estimated that 77 percent of aid to Afghanistan is 
administered through foreign militaries and outside the control of the government.  
This contravenes the principles laid out in the Paris Declaration that call for 
ownership and harmonization of aid.121  Of the 23 percent of total aid channeled 
through the GoIRA, roughly half is dedicated to priorities of the Afghan National 
Development Strategy.122  This points to a trend of Afghans having less control over 
their future and leads to a question of whether this is detrimental to strategy.  Can 
objectives be met with less input from Afghans?  Is aid being used to meet the goals 
of international donors or those of Afghans?  
National Solidarity Program (NSP) 
For my first case study of independent aid, I will focus on the National 
Solidarity Program (NSP) in Afghanistan. Created in 2003 with the World Bank 
Group and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the goal 
of the NSP is to focus on rural areas and “…develop the ability of Afghan 
communities to identify, plan, manage and monitor their own development 
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projects.”123  In a World Bank Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Grant to 
Afghanistan, the Bank identifies the goal of the NSP as:  
“… to strengthen community level governance in Afghanistan and to 
improve the access of rural communities to social and productive 
infrastructure and services by channeling resources to democratically-
elected Community Development Councils (CDCs) and building the 
capacity of CDCs to facilitate community level investments.” 124  
 
These objectives align with those of the US Armies’ “Counterinsurgency” field 
manual goal, which identifies political power as the central issue when fighting 
insurgencies and therefore argues for building the government’s capacity, and the 
people’s confidence in the government to provide services and stability.125  The NSP 
does this by building the local rural community’s capacity to elect representatives, 
identify community needs and involve a larger cross section of the community in 
rebuilding.  Currently, 60 percent of the Afghan population is involved some way in 
the agriculture sector.  Consequently, central government programs that focus on rural 
communities are of major importance in gaining the trust of the population.  The 
NSP’s community- driven approach to development gives the Afghans viable skills 
and institutions to sustain themselves, which debunks the insurgents’ argument that 
the government cannot provide for the people.  It also stands in opposition to the US 
governments’ COIN guides goal for a more coordinated approach with the military.  
How the NSP is structured is important to its goal of strengthening the 
government and empowering the people.  Often times, aid programs leave 
beneficiaries feeling disenfranchised because of their lack of input in choosing 
projects in their communities.  This in turn results in projects that do not meet 
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community needs.  The NSP differs, in that while the development aid to support the 
program is provided by the World Bank and other bi-lateral donors, the decisions of 
how the aid is spent is largely identified by the community.  This requires the 
integration of all members in order to be successful.  The idea of the community 
taking ownership of its own development, which will allow for sustainable growth in 
the future, is in line with the aid communities’ recent focus on human security.   
The NSP is structured so that the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation 
and Development (MRRD) is responsible for distributing aid in the form of small 
block grants to rural villages.  The villages are eligible for the grants after they have 
elected what is known as the Community Development Councils (CDC). The role of 
the CDC is to identify the needs of the community with the consultation of an 
NGO.126 CDCs are elected by the local community and have been considered largely 
successful and accepted within the community because of a rule that requires they 
include both men and women.  Where as traditional shura ruling councils were all 
men, today women members make up 35 percent of the council members.127  This 
integration has not only resulted in the empowerment of women, but also more 
effective governance because involving women in the decision making process allows 
for identifying more of the community’s needs as a whole. 
The result of the CDCs has been local Afghan ownership of their future and a 
vested interest from the beginning to the end of the project.  The way that the NSP is 
funded has also played a major role in its success.  While the World Bank and other 
donors provide funds, the size of the individual grants given to communities is 
limited.  This means that not only are grants manageable on a smaller scale to meet 
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specific village needs, they also reach larger parts of the rural region.  Distributed in 
what are known as block grants of $200 dollars per family, with a $60,000 limit per 
village and an additional 10 percent of the cost contributed through cash and labor, 
these are distributed after the Community Development Program (CDP) has 
identified, through community input, what is needed.128 Additionally, the program 
empowers communities to “…collectively contribute to increased human security.”129  
CDCs are unique in that NGOs merely act as Facilitating Partners (FP).  The hope is 
that by empowering Afghan communities to foster their own development, they are 
more likely to achieve human security and become less reliant on foreign aid in the 
future.   
The administration of the program is what is key to achieving many of its 
stated goals.  As opposed to many aid programs administered in coordination with the 
US military, the NSP operates through the mechanisms of the Afghan government 
and input of the local community.  As of 2010, the NSP had received $1.1 billion in 
funding from the World Bank and bilateral donors.130  The program is funded through 
the multilateral World Bank Groups’ International Development Association, which 
is comprised of 148 donor countries who contribute aid distributed through the bank 
to promote development projects around the world.  Through the International 
Development Association, the World Bank has contributed $358 million in IDA 
grants stages since its first inception in 2003 after the US invasion.131 
The overall goal of COIN operations is to win the hearts and minds of the 
population by providing security, while at the same time building long-term 
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legitimacy for the government.  The Coalition forces have attempted to do this 
through initiatives like Quick Impact Projects (QIP), a program established in 2003, 
which utilize funds from a pool, which commanders can then easily access in order to 
fund small, highly visible projects like repairing roads and schools, which in turn are 
aimed at achieving stability and legitimacy for the Afghan Government.132  For 
instance in 2007, PRTs working in conjunction with USAID representatives, focused 
on kinetic regions in the south of Afghanistan, building roads and implementing cash 
for work programs to win over the hearts and minds of the local population.133  These 
projects are largely focused on regions that lack stability.  It is the structure and the 
implementation of the NSP and its focus on human security that is the backbone of 
the program, that delineates it from QIP.  As opposed to QIP, that aim to win hearts 
and minds through highly visible projects, NSP projects are based on community 
input.  
The importance of the whole community’s input cannot be understated.  
Development projects do not have an impact unless they meet the real needs of an 
entire community.  Recently a study was undertaken, with the support of the World 
Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organizations of the United Nations and the MRRD 
to study the impact of the NSP on Afghan rural communities.  This study involved 
conducting a baseline survey to compare future findings with.  For the study, both 
men and women were interviewed as to what they viewed as the top development 
priority for their village.  Both female and male respondents cited access to clean 
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water as the number one priority, followed by schools and hospitals.134  Furthermore, 
the baseline survey found that the role of women in the villages was distorted under 
the current dominance of the shura council.  “92 percent responded that the council or 
village leaders had done nothing for women within the past year and 91 percent 
responded that there was no formal role by which women could participate in the 
village council.”135  Furthermore, the survey showed that women felt that they should 
have a role in the council in some form.  Seventy percent of women felt females 
should have membership in the council and 86 percent felt there should be a separate 
council for women.  While only 43 percent of men supported women membership in 
the council, 85 percent supported a separate female council.136  The baseline survey is 
important in that it shows that by forming CDCs, which require female membership, 
they are addressing issues of the community at the most basic level of decision 
making.  As the NSP is implemented by the Afghan government, it aims to build trust 
in the central government’s ability to govern.  The baseline survey discredits the 
Taliban’s argument that the people do not want more rights to be provided for women 
or more services.  However, cultural norms have played a role in the effectiveness of 
the NSP and present challenges to the central governments. 
Beginning in 2008 and culminating in 2010, the Feinstein Center at Tufts 
University, led by Professor Andrew Wilder, conducted a study on the relationship 
between aid and security in Northern Afghanistan, which included an analysis of the 
NSP.  Perceptions of the NSP were positive in many respects.  Respondents favored 
the way that funds were distributed because of the fair and democratic nature of the 
community electing a council and the council deciding what projects to initiate.  
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Furthermore, the NSP is seen as more transparent and less corrupt.137  This was in 
contrast to Cash for Work (CFW) programs, which were often times implemented by 
commanders, with little oversight or accountability, resulting in nepotism and 
resentment.138 
Furthermore, the general perception of the NSP in the province compared to 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which were teams composed of combined civilian 
and military personnel tasked with carrying out the COIN objectives and more 
specifically development projects to win hearts and minds, was generally positive.  
Not only did respondents appreciate the transparency of the NSP, but they also liked 
the skills that they gained through working in coordination with the CDCs and 
connections made to the government.  The success of the NSP was tangible in the 
responses analysts obtained from Afghans living in villages where the NSP had not 
been implemented.  Many respondents had heard of the successes of the NSP and 
hoped for the program to be brought to their villages.139  Faryab is a province of 
Northern Afghanistan with a primarily Uzbek and Tajik population, along with 
smaller percentages of Pashtuns, Turkmen and Hazra.140   While the Farayab province 
is less violent than many other provinces, the positive reaction of Afghans to the NSP 
speaks to the possibilities of development without linkages to the military.   
There is also evidence of a relationship between the NSP and the relative 
security that their development projects have produced.  The ultimate goal of 
insurgents is to win over the general population and gain legitimacy. Because of the 
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fact that that the NSP is based on community-driven development and villagers have a 
stake in the projects, the Taliban has been more reluctant to attack these projects out 
of fear of alienating the population.  Gregory Wagner, in an article for the 
Washington Monthly, cites a Human Rights Watch survey of Afghan school burnings 
that suggests that schools built by the NSP are less likely to be attacked because of the 
communities’ stake.  Dennis De Tray explains that, “If you're the Taliban, you feel 
some comfort in attacking things built by foreigners... But you don't want to create 
animosity among citizens you're trying to recruit to your side."141  This relationship 
between security and how aid is distributed is important when taking into account the 
disproportionate amount of development aid that is distributed in coordination with 
the military.  In the context of fighting insurgents, it cannot be forgotten that how 
development aid is administered is as important as the outcome of that development 
aid.  COIN campaigns are about perceptions just as much as they are about engaging 
the enemy or providing for the people.  In the case of Afghanistan, if and when the 
people begin to take ownership of their future and also see the government as 
facilitating that prosperity, the Taliban is likely to lose legitimacy. 
The sheer size of the NSP demonstrates the commitment the Afghan 
government has made to community- driven development across the whole of 
Afghanistan.  Since its inception in 2003, 22,500 CDCs have been established across 
all 34 Afghan provinces.142  Evaluations of the NSP program have shown mixed 
results in terms of its effectiveness.  A major hurdle that the central government of 
Afghanistan has had to deal with is the traditional cultural norms that challenge 
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central government authority.  While villages throughout the country have embraced 
CDCs, their ability to displace traditional shura councils has not been as effective.  In 
many villages, people have embraced the democratic concept and elected leaders that 
include women.  However, the CDCs have only managed to exist alongside the 
shuras, failing to gain more effective authority.  It is predominantly the men of the 
villages who are more reluctant to cede authority to the central government; trusting 
more in elders and the clergy.143  Much of the aid that has been channeled through the 
NSP to the villages has been effective in creating positive perceptions of government.  
However, villages have still been reluctant to cede authority.   
While the NSP has been successful in forming CDCs and gaining rights for 
women in the councils, the effectiveness of development projects has been 
questioned.  NSP development projects have addressed village needs for clean water 
and electricity, but they have failed to show improvement in economic activity or 
access to infrastructure.144  The lack of improvement in economic welfare is very 
worrisome to the NSP project.  Because of the nature of insurgencies, the more 
immediate the results, the more the chances are that the insurgents will not be able to 
gain legitimacy.  While there are many different factors that create economic growth, 
stability and good governance, time is not on the side of those conducting COIN.  It is 
not only the results relative to the Afghan people that are worrisome.  As the war 
drags on, the will of the American public has begun to wane and questions of the 
feasibility of success have risen, leading to calls for withdrawal.  Consequently, time 
is of the essence. 
The Tufts University study also hi-lighted many of the challenges that the 
NSP faces in Afghanistan.  For some Afghans, the NSP program presents 
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opportunities for some at the expense of others.  Like the Afghan Central government, 
the CDC has not been immune to major bouts of corruption.  Many Afghans see the 
NSP as bringing corruption to a local level because of the amount of money that has 
been made available to corrupt and powerful figures.145  In some cases, commanders 
or village elders have co-opted the CDC for their own purposes, causing resentment 
throughout the community.  In Sholgara District of Karab Province, located in 
Northern Afghanistan, a CDC chief was ousted after having submitted fake bills, 
stealing furniture meant for the meeting house and funneling benefits to his own 
family.146  At times CDCs were even controlled from the outside by influential 
members of the community, creating resentment amongst community members.  FPs 
have not been spared accusations of misusing block grants, which has made 
maintaining legitimacy and working partnerships more difficult.147  Fortunately, the 
democratic process of the CDCs has mitigated many of these problems.   
The success of NSP has to be viewed in relation to other projects operating in 
Afghanistan and the context of the Afghan situation.  The program is operating in a 
conflict environment in which the country’s civil service system and infrastructure 
have largely been destroyed.  Because the judicial system and security are weak, it is 
reasonable to expect that some forms of corruption will exist.  However, the reactions 
of the community have been largely positive when compared to other programs 
operating in the region.  Afghans have largely embraced the democratic principles of 
the CDCs and the concept of having a stake in choosing and implementing 
development projects. Furthermore, the defense of these projects by the Afghans and 
the reluctance on the part of the Taliban to commit acts of sabotage relating to NSP 
projects speaks volumes to the importance of community driven projects. The general 
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positive feedback about the program from the government, villagers and international 
donors, reported by the Tufts University Feinstein International Center, signals a 
chance to duplicate aspects in other provinces. As the COIN mission advances, it is 
important to study programs like the NSP in order to gain knowledge of best 
practices.  
Norwegian PRT Model 
Much of the debate regarding the use of coordinated foreign aid is in response 
to major programs that were initiated by the US military in response to deteriorating 
security situations.  In both Iraq and Afghanistan the US military created what are 
known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are designed to incorporate 
both military and civilian capabilities into one unit that can provide both security and 
development in insecure zones, in an effort to win hearts and minds.  This has 
garnered much attention in the international development community because the 
method of combining civil and military capabilities has called into question whether it 
meets ethical standards and if it is effective.   
The case of the Norwegian PRT operating in Faryab province of Afghanistan 
represents an interesting case study that demonstrates the use of methods that are not 
common to the PRTs and could offer some insight into best practices.  As Faryab is 
primarily Uzbek and Tajik population, along with smaller percentages of Turkmen 
and Hazra148 and as the Taliban are predominantly Pashtun, their presence in the 
province has not been as strong, resulting in a relatively more stable security situation 
than that of other provinces.  The question is whether this relatively secure situation 
can be related to the Norwegian PRT methods and if they are winning over the 
Afghan population away from the Taliban Insurgency. 
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Based on studies of British and Irish PRTs, Afghans found that often times 
PRTs were not as responsive to their needs because of the complicated relationship 
that they had relating to their structure, security and mission.  Many respondents 
found that while the PRTs attempted to communicate with the villagers, the tendency 
to repeat the same mistakes gave people the impression that PRT members were 
going through the motions, rather than genuinely responding to needs.149  By focusing 
on winning the hearts and minds of the population, rather than presenting long-term 
solutions, the PRTs were further disenfranchising the population.  For some, the 
ability of the PRTs to implement projects was lacking all together.  “Development 
projects are beyond their [PRT] capacity and do not help them in winning hearts and 
minds either. They have only succeeded in creating publicity for themselves. Now 
many people know who they are and how much resources they have.”150  In 
Afghanistan, because of the insurgents’ tactics of trying to discredit the government 
and occupying forces, publicity is often the last thing that groups want.  
What sets the Norwegian PRT apart from others is its insistence on drawing a 
line between the mission of the military and that of development. While the military 
branch in the US PRTs is active in development projects, this is not the case in the 
Norwegian model. In a joint statement, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Foreign Defense and Ministry of Justice and Police stated that, “The main 
aim of the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan is to support the Afghan authorities 
in their responsibility to ensure stability, security and development.”151  While these 
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goals are intertwined in many respects, the way that they are implemented is an 
important distinction. 
In theory, the Norwegian government utilizes what is called the integrated or 
whole of government approach to carrying out their mission.  The integrated approach 
is based on the premise that security, governance and development cannot be 
achieved without coordination between all sectors.152 However, when examined more 
closely the Norwegian approach for meeting their goals has not fully applied this 
theory and has differed significantly from the common US PRT operating in 
Afghanistan.  While embracing the idea of the integrated approach, the Norwegians 
interpret this as meaning that, “The respective roles of the Norwegian civilian and 
military actors shall be clearly distinguished, and the coordination between all actors 
shall be strengthened and their efforts made coherent. The civilian component shall 
therefore be drawn out of the PRT and linked more closely to the local authorities and 
to the UN (UNAMA) as soon as the security situation permits.”153  This implies 
instead that the civilian sector is to work more in coordination with the Afghan 
government rather than the military.  However, there is still debate today within 
Norwegian society as to the proper relationship between the military and civilian 
coordination when distributing aid. 
Many leaders within the military establishment have embraced the idea of the 
military as a distributor of aid or collaborator with the aid community.   After a 
campaign in the village of Ghormach, Badghis Province, the military advocated for an 
influx of development aid, which would help to secure and win the hearts and minds 
of the population.  However, the Norwegian NGO community was less enthusiastic 
about the idea of inserting themselves into a situation where the safety of workers 
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would be an issue.154  At the crux of the argument is whether the Norwegian 
integrated approach will bring about visible benefits.  As opposed to the US COIN 
strategy, which calls for winning hearts and minds through quick win projects the 
Norwegian strategy envisions long term and sustainable projects as more effective in 
creating legitimacy for the government and helping the population. 
Norwegian NGOs have argued that attempting to achieve short-term security 
goals instead of pursuing a long-term strategy of development puts Afghans at risk 
because of the implications of benefiting from the military action.  If communities are 
seen as benefiting from the work of military development projects, they may be seen 
as colluding with foreign occupiers. Therefore, they argue, NGOs that maintain their 
impartiality are most qualified to provide aid.155  Without maintaining these standards 
the NGOs stand to be viewed as another part of the military and as having ulterior 
motives.  The Norwegian government has continued to support NGOs, which 
continue to operate separately from the military. 
The PRT has two pillars: one military and one civilian. The 
two components are separated in terms of mandate and employees, 
however close cooperation and multidisciplinarity is a key to success 
including respect for each other’s competences. The task of the 
military part of the PRT is, as part of the ISAF (International Security 
Assistance Force) operation, to promote a good security environment 
in the Faryab province and to facilitate development and 
reconstruction. The civilian component consists of police liaison 
officers, prison officers and civilian advisors, including a development 
and political advisor.156 
 
This has allowed the Norwegian aid community to operate and be viewed as more 
impartial providers of aid.  Recent studies by the Norwegian Government, The 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and The Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, while not conclusive, have indicated that the Norwegian Model 
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deserves closer analysis because of its strengths in providing aid and Afghan 
perceptions of the PRT. 
The ability of the Norwegians to adequately provide quality aid projects to 
Faryab province has been helped by their willingness to coordinate with the Afghan 
institutions.  As opposed to PRTs run by other countries, the Norwegian PRT has 
rejected the use of Quick Impact Projects (QIP) and projects run through Civil 
Military Cooperation (CIMIC).  These QIP and CIMIC projects are designed to win 
hearts and minds, with funds provided by the military as opposed to the Ministry of 
foreign affairs.157  The explicit military and political goals of these programs have 
caused critics to question their impact, effectiveness and the security effects on the 
communities receiving the aid.  Furthermore these types of projects blur the 
traditional rules of aid distribution based on providing aid to mitigate the impacts of 
war.  In contrast, the Norwegian PRT has embraced a different strategy based on 
Afghan priorities and needs as opposed to the political and security needs of the 
military.  
PRT Meymaneh (Capital of Faryab province) is based on a model 
which entails that the PRT does not implement development projects 
of its own. Instead, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo and the 
Norwegian Embassy in Kabul channel funds to programmes in Faryab, 
which are implemented through the World Bank, United Nations and 
NGOs. These programmes are chosen according to Afghan national 
priorities and the recommendations of the PRT. 158   
Not only does this meet the needs of the Afghan population, but it also allows the 
PRT to keep a lower profile while at the same time fulfilling its mission to provide 
assistance and support to the Afghan government.   
The tactic of utilizing the Afghan government to distribute aid has worked for 
the Norwegians in many respects.  To begin with, many NGOs and contractors have 
garnered bad reputations in Afghanistan.  The amount of money pumped into 
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Afghanistan since the invasion has made the country a hotbed for NGOs and 
contractors helping to implement programs and projects of all sizes.  Unfortunately, 
because of the sheer size of the aid packages and the pressure to spend money 
quickly, these programs have often been beset by problems.  Furthermore, the quality 
of some organizations operating in Afghanistan has been criticized.  Perceptions of 
contractors, NGOs and PRTs have been mixed as many have been viewed as greedy 
and corrupt.  Given that the goal of COIN is to win the hearts and minds of the 
population, some view the reputations of actors as a detriment to the overall mission.  
A recent study sponsored by the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA) 
and the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) found that a lack of 
communication between actors and the population was a major factor in causing 
negative perceptions of development projects.   
The Norwegian PRT has attempted to address some of the concerns expressed 
above by clearly delineating civilian and military functions.  The results have been 
positive when juxtaposed against reactions to other PRTs.  In the Feinstein Center 
study of Faryab province the general reaction towards the PRT was relatively 
positive.  While the population is aware of the presence of the Norwegian PRT, and 
the fact that they are a major donor for the region, the perception of the team is 
generally positive.159  Many PRTs in other provinces are seen as a liability that can 
possibly bring more violence to the region.  In the case of the Norwegian PRT, it 
appears in some instances that rather than seeing them as the reason for insecurity, 
some respondents equate them with providing aid.  One villager responded, “We are 
happy with the Norwegian PRT, although they cannot guarantee security in the whole 
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province because they don’t know the area. But they do provide a lot of aid.”160  The 
analysis and positive reviews of the Norwegian PRTs seems somewhat to support the 
arguments against aid distribution through the military.  Receivers of aid are aware of 
the intentions of aid distribution and channeling it through the military apparatus 
seems to give it a negative perception.  By utilizing GoIRA institutions, the Afghan 
people are empowered and the Norwegian PRTs are able to make a difference without 
being viewed as an entity working to achieve military objectives 
Aga Khan Development Network 
As opposed to aid distributed through the military, many NGOs in 
Afghanistan have been operating in Afghanistan and distributing aid for an extended 
period of time and in turn have developed relationships with the communities in 
which they work. 
The Aga Khan Development Network is a prime example of an organization 
that has long-term ties within communities and has in turn utilized these ties to 
promote meaningful and sustainable development.  Furthermore, the cultural ties that 
the organization shares with the communities they work in have further created trust 
that makes legitimacy possible.  For all people, an understanding of their needs comes 
not merely from an influx of money.  Rather, an understanding of cultural context and 
customs when implementing development projects is as important and a much more 
effective way of conveying sincerity and winning the hearts and minds of a 
population. 
 The Aga Khan Development Network, founded and chaired by Aga Khan, 
who is the leader and 49th hereditary Imam of the Shia Ismali Muslims and has 
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worked in this capacity for over 50 years.161  While the network is a non-
denominational organization, it does follow the ethical principles of Islam, 
“…particularly consultation, solidarity with those less fortunate, self reliance and 
human dignity…”162  In many ways this is important to its success in that the ISAF is 
seen as occupiers or having ulterior motives for being in the country and not being 
Muslim.  In the words of a tribal leader, “It would be a bit difficult for the PRT or the 
military to achieve winning hearts and minds because people still look at them 
suspiciously as foreigners.  It would be good if Islamic countries replaced them and 
started talking to the Taliban.”163  This demonstrates the negative feelings towards 
ISAF that still persist today and calls into question the notion that by simply 
providing aid, the population will support you.  In reality, the population is aware of 
some parts of the ISAF mission, while at the same time misinformed by the Taliban 
propaganda about others.  By utilizing as many GoIRA institutions, Muslim NGOs or 
independent NGOs, the insurgency has a more difficult time convincing civilians that 
the ISAF is benefiting from occupation or programs do not have their best interests at 
heart. 
The Aga Khan Development Network also has built a relationship with 
communities it has worked in over time.  The group began work in Afghanistan in 
1995, distributing Humanitarian aid in the northeast of the country and has developed 
trust within communities from this relationship built through the years. 164   Today 
they are involved in social, cultural and economic development throughout the 
country and currently act as a facilitating partner in the GoIRA NSP program and also 
in promoting small business enterprise in the Afghan community. 
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As an FP for the NSP the Aga Khan is an ideal partner because of its previous 
experience with communities in Afghanistan and affiliation with Islam. 
It is in its role as an FP that the organization is able to use its knowledge of the 
community in order to more adequately facilitate development projects.  In testimony 
before the Wartime Contracting Commission, Anne C. Richard of the International 
Rescue Committee testified to the importance of the relationship and genuine 
partnership between communities and facilitating partners.  In the Afghan NSP 
program the FPs are NGOs as opposed to outside contractors. 
NGOs have in-depth knowledge of the communities we serve.  We 
often arrive in these countries before we are awarded grants and stay 
when that grant is over.  Because of our long-term approach, our staff 
has extensive knowledge of the communities in which we work.  This 
knowledge is built over years of earning trust, ensuring community 
involvement in decision making, and promoting a greater sense of 
ownership.165 
 
In contrast, private contractors carry out many of the projects developed through aid 
distributed by the US military, without ties to the community.  While the NGO FPs 
are paid a fee for their work, because as NGOs they often times promote social causes 
they have the ability to donate their own funds to causes they feel are worthy.  In the 
case of the Aga Khan Development Network, during a project to bring electricity to 
the Uland and Khushpak villages, the price of the project cost more than the grant that 
the villager had received.  However, the Aga Khan Development Network was able to 
supplement the rest of the project with additional funds of $13,000.166  With outside 
contractors as facilitating partners for these projects, the extra money necessary to 
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continue the project would not have been available.  Furthermore, outside contractors 
have little vested interest in the community besides getting paid for the project.  
 Oxfam in Iraq 
 As the debate continues as to what kind of aid should be distributed and how, 
Oxfam has argued since the beginning of the war that the focus on development 
projects to win hearts and minds of the population in COIN is the wrong tactic.  As 
Iraqis have struggled with humanitarian crises the differences between the amount of 
humanitarian and development assistance given has been significant.  Table 3.1 shows 
the decrease in humanitarian assistance from more than $862 million in 2003 all the 
way to $95 million in 2006.  This is in comparison $1.2 billion in development aid in 
2003, which then increased to $18 billion in 2006.167  As the security situation has 
stabilized relatively, the amount of humanitarian aid has decreased, but the gulf 
between humanitarian and development aid still exists as humanitarian crises persist.  
In 2009 Iraq received $497 million dollars in humanitarian aid compared to $2.9 
billion in development aid.168  
Table 4.2 Emergency Humanitarian Assistance and ODA to Iraq from DAC 
donors 2003-2006 ($millions) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Emergency 
Humanitarian 
assistance from 
DAC donors 
862.48 875.09 453.43 95 
Assistance for 
Development Only 
1,232.50 3,518.73 20,948.64 18,010.10 
Source: Mary Kirkbride, Michael Bailey, Manal Omar, p. 24. 
Additionally, the formation of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
(CERP) by the US congress is intended to provide funds to commanders in need of 
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urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.  Congress has consequently 
provided funds of $854 million in 2005 and $500 million in 2006 and 2007.169  While 
this shows the commitment of the US military to provide humanitarian aid, it is also 
bound to draw criticism from aid workers as to what are the intentions of the military 
implementing development projects in regions that are still dealing with humanitarian 
crises, in what some would argue is a case of putting the cart before the horse.  
Defense secretary Robert Gates hoped for the US government to permanently increase 
the military’s overall capabilities in “long-term reconstruction, development and 
governance.”170  What does this mean for the future of humanitarian principles? Is the 
government and military, in distributing aid, focusing too much on meeting political 
goals as opposed to meeting the basic needs of those experiencing humanitarian 
crises?  While political calculations are always a factor in aid distribution, many 
organizations see the military further expanding their role, especially under the 
pretense of COIN, as further threatening aid workers and their ability to deliver 
effective aid.171  
Oxfam has argued that under international law, the Iraqi people have a right to 
assistance and protection based on traditional humanitarian principles of aid 
distribution, but in the Coalition forces’ efforts to win hearts and minds, immediate 
humanitarian needs are being neglected in favor of development projects and political 
goals.  Two years after the start of the Iraq war the World Food Program in Iraq 
released a study that showed the malnutrition rate in Iraq to be 26% of the 
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population.172  This is evidence of a major humanitarian crisis, yet, as illustrated in 
table 3.2, humanitarian aid continued to decrease from 2003 to 2006 in favor of 
development assistance.  Furthermore, there needs to be more of a focus on providing 
humanitarian aid without discrimination because civilians suffer “…from a denial of 
fundamental human rights in the form of chronic poverty, malnutrition, illness, lack of 
access to basic services, and destruction of homes, vital facilities, and infrastructure, 
as well as injury and death.”173  This disturbing situation of extreme violence has 
resulted from, in large part, a myriad of problems related to insurgents, sectarian 
violence and general power struggles.   
After the beginning of the war in Iraq the security situation was so unstable 
that many organizations were not able to reach communities in need and deliver 
assistance in non-combat zones.  Furthermore, they feared that the US government 
would use the opportunity to distribute humanitarian aid as a chance to portray 
themselves as liberators, violating the rules of impartiality and neutrality.174  In a 
briefing paper Oxfam International argues that civilian actors are the most qualified to 
administer humanitarian aid whenever possible.  Citing the 2001 Draft Oslo 
Guidelines, the authors say that it “…establishes that military and civilian-defense 
capabilities are a means of last resort in responding to the needs of civilians in an 
emergency.”175  Furthermore, the paper argues that there needs to be less of a focus on 
Quick Impact Projects and more of a focus on cost effective aid administered by UN 
aid agencies and other organizations.176  Without the proper skill sets and qualified 
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administrators, aid is bound to be spent inefficiently and cause resentment and 
confusion about who is an aid worker, and consequently cause more suffering within 
the population.  
The continued insecurity within Iraq has resulted in the exodus of international 
NGOs from the country because of an inability to guarantee the safety of employees.  
This has been compounded by many NGO’s adherence to traditional humanitarian 
principles and refusal to accept funds from countries involved in the war out of fear of 
being perceived as impartial.177  Therefore, they argue that the military must maintain 
its neutrality and role as provider of security. 
 In spite of all of the factors that have limited, on many levels, NGOs’ ability to 
function within the country, it has not fully diminished their ability to still provide 
some assistance that adheres to humanitarian principles and is less influenced by 
COIN objectives.  Currently, while not operating in Iraq because of security concerns, 
Oxfam International operates from offices in Jordan by partnering with Iraqi 
organizations still functioning within the country.  So bad was the security situation 
beginning in 2003 that the organization has been forced to hide their affiliation with 
Iraqi NGOs out of fear for the Iraqis’ safety.178  In July 2007 Oxfam argued for a 
return to traditional humanitarian principles, highlighting some of the NGOs they 
anonymously worked with and the work that they had achieved.  These included 
organizations that provided healthcare to more than 100,000 Iraqis, the pre-
positioning of medical supplies in potential conflict zones and food and water to 
internally displaced people throughout the country, even with limited funds.179  
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Oxfam has also been able to provide assistance in Iraq by serving on the NGO 
coordinating committee for Iraq.180  
Limits placed on Oxfam are evident when viewing their work in comparison 
to their activities in other regions.  Oxfam and other organizations have been excluded 
from participation in Iraq for reasons including their commitments to certain 
standards of operation and security concerns.  As COIN continues, NGOs have been 
forced to adapt to the environment and in many cases this has meant taking a lesser 
public role.  Recent studies identified what was described as a toxic environment for 
aid workers.181  What was left of a visible aid and humanitarian mission in 2007 was 
one largely connected to the military and carried with it a lot of baggage regarding 
politics and neutrality.  This highlights the need for better communication or 
coordination in some fashion between NGOs and the military.  Coalition military 
forces continue to provide humanitarian aid, yet insecurity persists in many regions of 
the country.  Differences in the amount of funding for development projects versus 
humanitarian related projects, combined with the continuing human security threats to 
the Iraqi population are significant and deserve more attention.   
 As the military continues to develop their capacity to provide development 
and humanitarian aid, the recognition of the importance of civilian actors must be 
kept at the center of the debate.  Former Secretary of State Robert Gates highlighted 
this when he pointed out that aid distributed by the military “is no replacement for 
civilian involvement and expertise.”182  However, this will require dialogue between 
both sides and a common understanding of the roles of each party. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the paradigm that the world 
operated in and the repercussions from this event still resonate today.  Stemming from 
those attacks, the US has justified engagement in two wars, costing billions of dollars 
and countless soldier and civilian lives on both sides.  According to a 2011 report, 
since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has spent $806 billion in Iraq, $444 billion in 
Afghanistan, $29 billion in enhanced base security and $5 billion in unallocated 
funds, for a total of $1.283 trillion.183 The global financial crisis of 2008 has further 
compounded the mounting debt that the US has accrued to the point of threatening its 
financial future and those countries dependent on trade with the US.  Ironically, as 
America battles terrorism, insurgencies and financial meltdowns, in a speech on 
Aljazeera TV, Osama Bin Laden stated that one of the tactics of al Qaida was 
“continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.” 184  With the 
US debt at $14 trillion in 2011 and the country forced to make serious decisions about 
its economic future, all forms of spending should be scrutinized for effectiveness and 
foreign aid will be held to the same standard. 
I hypothesized that the traditional relationship between aid workers and the 
military in the distribution of foreign aid in COIN operations is inadequate and 
dysfunctional. Furthermore, I argued that while both parties are important vehicles in 
the distribution of aid, because of the lack of coordination between them, COIN has 
been much less effective.  Therefore, my thesis studied the ways in which aid is 
distributed by aid workers and the military, in order to uncover evidence to support 
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my thesis and draw conclusions as to what are the best practices in aid distribution, 
when dealing with insurgencies and winning hearts and minds. 
However, my research has revealed evidence that does not fully support my 
hypothesis. Debate around the use of foreign aid in COIN has centered on whether it 
violates humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality.  In the past NGO 
coordination with the government or military has largely been discouraged and been 
considered a conflict of interest in their ability to deliver aid effectively.  However, 
this conflict of interest seems to be more of a grey area than it initially appears and 
organizations seem to have drawn different distinctions as to what this actually 
means.  Many NGOs that strive to maintain impartiality are funded and entirely 
independent of any government programs.  However, others still receive funds from 
government organizations like USAID and are said to be impartial.  The fact is that 
offices like USAID are part of the government; they fund militaries, and are to some 
degree political because of their affiliation.  The attempt to distinguish between 
governments and the militaries they fund seems to represent a problem for NGOs 
considering the obvious relationship between them.  Again, those organizations that 
work to promote programs like the NSP are involved in initiatives that are inherently 
political in their goals of creating a stronger civil society that is affiliated with the 
GoIRA.  Furthermore, many NGOs are working to promote institutions and ideals 
that go against the very core ideals of the insurgent groups.  This then begs the 
question of whether their claims of impartiality and neutrality are legitimate.  This is 
important as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq continue into their tenth year and the 
struggle to defeat the insurgents appears in many respects to be making little 
headway. 
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This is not to say that there are not degrees of impartiality that can be 
identified when distributing aid.  It is clear that embedding civilians within PRTs is 
not an ideal model because of the impression that it gives to civilians of the military 
being a chief provider of aid.  Additionally, the problem of the blurring of identities of 
aid workers and soldiers makes it more difficult for civilians to make the distinction 
between their roles.  In Afghanistan and Iraq this has created considerable problems 
as PRT associated projects have become targets for insurgents, based on military and 
political associations.   
Unfortunately, in certain areas in which COIN is being carried out, insecurity 
is extremely high and the military is the only possible provider of aid available.  In 
these situations alone the PRTs stand to serve a useful function in providing basic 
humanitarian aid, with the help of aid workers, for suffering civilians.  As was shown 
in the earlier research, the militaries capacity to deliver development aid has not 
reached a level in which effective projects can be achieved through the PRTs in 
highly insecure regions.  Instead, the focus on quick impact projects to win hearts and 
minds has created resentment among the population because of the poor work of 
contractors with no permanent stake in the region and a lack of quality control related 
to projects.  
Part of the reason that PRTs have experiences failure is related to the problems 
that are encountered when trying to achieve development objectives in insecure areas.  
Because of their focus on security, soldiers are not able to fully utilize the skills of 
civilian aid workers and are forced to pick and choose the advice that works in the 
given security situation.  This makes for incomplete and inefficient programs and 
implementation.  By focusing on gaining security and providing humanitarian aid the 
military will be more able to competently coordinate with the aid community in tasks 
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that it has trained for and performed well in the past.  Furthermore, the military and 
aid workers projects will be less of a target because they are focusing on less high 
profile projects.  Quick impact projects can be of short-term benefit, but if 
implemented poorly, they stand to impede the COIN objective of winning hearts and 
minds. 
In areas that are more secure, civil/military separation stands to serve the 
population best and achieve COIN objectives.  The Norwegian model demonstrates 
how the separation of functions best delineates the relationship between civilians, aid 
workers and military.  Furthermore, civilian aid workers are the most qualified to 
implement projects by helping to promoting community driven development that 
allows civilians to choose projects that meet their needs.  It is most important for aid 
workers to encourage ownership of projects in the community by channeling them 
through government institutions.  Ownership encourages citizens to defend projects 
from insurgent attacks in the future and helps the government gain legitimacy as 
catalysts of change. 
In response to the failure of development aid in the past, recipient countries 
have advocated for reforms in aid disbursement in post-conflict and fragile states that 
can be applied to both Iraq and Afghanistan.  In December 2010, on the sidelines of 
the OECD International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Dili, Timor-
Leste, conflict affected and fragile states met to share lessons learned in an attempt to 
decide the future of development in their countries.  Out of this meeting the g7+ 
(Afghanistan is a member) was formed, the Dili Declaration was drafted, and the g7+ 
statement was agreed upon, which called members to “reduce poverty, deter conflicts 
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and provide better conditions for our people.”185  Subsequent work of the g7+ has 
resulted in what is known as the “New Deal”, which was adopted by the international 
community at the Fourth High Level on Aid Effectiveness in Busan South Korea in 
November 2011.   
Currently, as can be seen by the different methods of engagement by different 
country’s PRTs, there is a lack of coordination on the part of the international 
community in their efforts to defeat the insurgencies using foreign aid.  The New Deal 
builds on experiences of fragile states to guide donor engagement in fragile states.  
Central to the New Deal is a focus on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), 
that call for, among other things, legitimate politics that “foster inclusive political 
settlements and conflict resolution” and security.186  Additionally, the new deal calls 
for countries to “FOCUS on new ways of engaging, to support inclusive country-led 
and country-owned transitions out of fragility…” and ”TRUST by providing aid and 
managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results.”187  The 
New Deal principles, most importantly country led development, will undercut the 
insurgents claims of international interference and will allow the aid community to 
have more separation from the military.  While security in certain regions is still a 
major issue, the New Deal’s focus on peacebuilding and statebuilding allow for 
fragile states like Iraq and Afghanistan to have the necessary institutions to counter 
the insurgencies arguments against ineffective government and gain legitimacy.   
As the US winds down its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, defeat of 
insurgents is perhaps the most important objective to an overall successful mission.  
Not only will failure damage American prestige, but it could also stand to embolden 
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insurgencies and terrorist networks throughout the region.  As can be seen in Iraq 
after the recent troop withdrawals, weak state institutions and renewed sectarian 
violence are threatening the future of the entire country.188  The Norwegian PRTs 
separating military and aid workers and support of local governance has reaped 
benefits for the entire community, which appears to be sustainable and equitable.  By 
maintaining humanitarian space for aid workers, continuing the traditional separation 
between civilians and the military, except in only the most insecure situations, and 
adopting the principles of the New Deal, the COIN operation stands to achieve its 
primary goals.   
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